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4Introduction
5Since its defeat in World War II, Japan has been governed by a unique 
constitutional structure that bans the use of force by the state.  Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution states, “the right of belligerency of the state will never be recognized.”  It 
also outlaws the ability of Japan to have a standing army, saying, “in order to accomplish 
the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war 
potential, will never be maintained.”  Article 9 has historically prevented Japan from 
deploying its Self Defense Force (SDF) overseas and forces any changes that exist to be 
slow and incremental.1 This single article has had a profound effect on Japanese foreign 
policy, serving as an institutional impediment to Japan involving itself in foreign conflict 
to the extent that Japan’s position in the world would seem to dictate.
For the last fifty years, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) has been charged 
with interpreting Article 9 to accommodate a changing world.2  The issue of 
interpretation is central to Article 9, as it has been reinterpreted to allow for change at 
several critical junctures.  One manifestation of this is that Japan has a substantial 
military force, which is legal because it is called a ‘self defense force’ and not a military.   
Another distinction that the CLB made was the distinction between collective self-
defense and collective security.  In order to promote the vitality of the US-Japan Alliance, 
it was ruled that Japan could participate in collective self-defense of the Japanese islands, 
but it could not participate in efforts of collective security, or protecting other countries.3
1
 For discussions on this topic, see: Twomey, Christopher. “Japan, a Circumscribed Balancer.” Security 
Studies 9, no. 4 (Summer 2000).; Grimes, William.  Institutionalized Inertia: Japanese Foreign Policy in the 
Post-Cold War World. In eds. Ikenberry, G. John and Michael Mastanduno. International Relations Theory 
and the Asia-Pacific. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.
2
 Samuels, Richard.  Who’s in Charge Here Anyway?  Presentation to the Olin and Weatherhead Centers, 
Harvard University (4/13/04). There is not a great deal of literature on this topic, but Samuels’ presentation 
and paper provide truly groundbreaking looks into a highly influential bureaucracy.
3
 Ibid.  The distinction between collective security and collective self-defense is crucial to understanding 
Japan’s security dilemma.  It can provide support for the United States on issues that directly affect the 
6That interpretation has allowed Japan to participate in some international efforts, but not 
in others, most notably the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and has historically prevented Japan 
from deploying its military forces abroad.  However, Article 9 has come under fire over 
the last four years and Japan has used the SDF in a military support role as a part of 
collective security efforts, a major change from the preceding fifty years when such 
action was unconstitutional.  Article 9 has been reinterpreted to allow for this as a 
contribution to the US-Japan Alliance.  This has posed a series of major problems and 
questions to be answered regarding Japan’s security policy and practice.  Specifically, 
under what conditions will Japan use the SDF for military support and what form will 
that support take?
Japan has historically adopted the idea of comprehensive security, a unique 
combination of an aggressive economic policy and a conservative military policy, under 
Article 9.  Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels characterize Japan as a ‘mercantile 
realist’ meaning that Japan pursues its security through economic measures.4  That policy 
creates economic interdependence inherently aimed at increasing the cost of any potential 
armed conflict with Japan.  Theoretically, the high cost of confrontation makes Japan 
safer as countries are less likely to go to war with it.  This analysis is largely supported in 
practice through most of the post cold war era, but the last five years have seen Japan 
move away from a strictly non-military posture.  Its recent record on security shows that 
Japan will react to direct threats posed to it, but that it will only do so when there are 
compelling domestic factors and when it is in close cooperation with the United States.  
security of Japan, such as SLOCs, but for much of the last fifty years, it has been unable to provide for 
regional security.  Though it would ostensibly make Japan more secure, it was unconstitutional, so Japan 
could not provide for its security in that way.
4
 Heginbotham, Eric and Richard Samuels. “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy.” 
International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 171-203.
7Without United States support, Japan has not taken on an aggressive posture and has 
maintained its mercantile realist strategies.  
The Defense Guidelines Review in 1997 represented a fundamental reorientation of 
Japan’s security policy.  It asserts a larger role for Japan within the alliance structure, 
stating
Both Governments will under normal circumstances enhance cooperation in a variety of areas. 
Examples include mutual support activities under the Agreement between the Government of Japan 
and the Government of the United States of America concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic 
Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of 
the United States of America.
Observers have held that Japan’s recent inclination towards increased participation in 
international security is resultant on this agreement, which is a further example of the 
way that Article 9 has been reinterpreted.  However, that does not fully account for the 
changes as it does not reflect the underlying motivations for Japanese action.  This 
implies blind alliance support, whereas Japan’s actions have been driven largely by issues 
in domestic politics.
The following analysis will first analyze Japan’s lack of participation in the first 
Persian Gulf War.  Japan declined to send troops to the region as the United States 
requested, instead making a significant cash donation to the war effort.  This is a clear 
example of “checkbook diplomacy” and non-involvement.  Japan bought its oil and 
economic security without sacrificing lives or its constitutional ideals.  Most importantly, 
there was no domestic imperative that drove Japan to provide military support.
Second, it will examine the war on terrorism and the significant advances that Japan 
made after the Persian Gulf War.  Japan participated in the war on terror in part to answer 
the call of the United States but also because of factors in domestic politics.  The contrast 
between the responses to these two military efforts is essential to the overall argument in 
8that Japan benefited from both efforts, but only participated in the latter.  The only clear 
difference between the two situations is the domestic situation in Japan supported a 
militarized response to terrorism.  Though the steps taken were largely symbolic, they 
will create a trend of intensely issue specific military involvement by Japan.  
After distinguishing between these two stark responses to international security 
dilemmas, this paper will contrast Japan’s response to a situation that has occurred twice 
within the last ten years; proliferation on the Korean Peninsula.  Though there are clear 
geostrategic incentives for Japan to be more heavily involved in the current crisis than 
there were in 1994, the primary driver in Japan’s involvement is a domestic issue.  The 
geostrategic threats have existed for longer than Japan has dealt with them, and a hard-
line approach by Japan was taken only when the issues of nuclear and missile 
proliferation were combined with the domestic issue of the abduction of Japanese citizens 
by North Korea.
These case studies will clearly illustrate two central points.  First, Japan is still 
engaged in a policy of ensuring security through economic means.  Secondly, there has 
been a reorientation of Japan’s security policy to allow for more military involvement 
when there is significant domestic justification.  When there is a geostrategic threat that 
also has significant resonance in Japan domestically, Japan will react militarily, but only 
in rear echelon support for the United States.  Though Japanese policy is consistently 
inching towards increased involvement in military affairs, there are still significant 
restraints preventing Japan from taking a normalized role in international security.
9Chapter 1: The Persian Gulf War and the 
War on Terror
10
In 1991, Iraq invaded Kuwait, beginning a decade of provocative action.  An 
international coalition was led by the United States to force Iraq out of Kuwait, of which 
Japan was only a financial contributor.  Though Japan’s economic interests were 
threatened, Iraq posed no military or domestic threat to Japan.  As such, the first major 
security dilemma of the post-Cold War era was marked by Japan pursuing “checkbook 
diplomacy.”  Japan pursued an economic policy and did not contribute military support.
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Japan was slow to react for a multitude of 
reasons, the first and foremost of which was that Japan felt no immediate threat.  Japan 
was out of missile range, had no security links with Middle Eastern countries and felt like 
getting involved could only intensify and prolong the war.5  For fifty years, Japan had 
been protected by the United States, through United States troops based on the main 
Japanese islands as part of the US-Japan Security Treaty.6  If the threat in the Middle East 
had been a military threat to Japan, it is unlikely that Japan would have reacted 
differently as the United States would have provided protection under already existing 
treaties.7  Even if Japan had sought to provide military support, which it did not, it would 
have come in strong opposition to the Chinese and Korean governments, both of which 
remembered the atrocities of World War II and had a strong desire to keep Japan from 
rearming and assuming a normalized security posture.8  Thus, there was no immediate 
threat to compel Japan to become involved militarily.
5
 Bennett, Andrew, Joseph Lepgold and Danny Unger, eds. Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Gulf 
War (NY: St Martins Press, 1997). 146.
6
 Ibid., 137
7
 Green, Michael.  “Balance of Power” US-Japan Relations in a Changing World.  Ed. Steven K. Vogel. 
(Washington, DC: Brookings, 2002).  24.
8
 “Japan aid for US led strikes unlikely to rouse Asian storm.” Japan Economic Newswire.  16 November 
2001.
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Secondly, Japan had strong economic reasons to stay out of an alliance in the 
Middle East.  As a mercantile realist, this is a primary motivation for its security policy; it 
would profit more by non-involvement.  Japanese banks were owed nearly 700 billion 
yen, $5 billion, by Middle Eastern borrowers.9  Becoming involved in a war against those 
borrowers could lead to them defaulting and not repaying their loans.  Even though 
Japanese oil interests were threatened more than those of other countries, 70% of 
Japanese oil was imported from the Middle East, as compared to the United States which 
only imported 12% of its oil from that region, Japan had learned from the oil shortages of 
the 1970’s that it could weather the storm and expected to pay higher oil prices as a result 
of the war.10  Japan had a 142 day oil reserve supply and felt that it could easily manage 
any economic impact that high oil prices, or a worldwide shortage, might bring.11
Japan only became involved in the Persian Gulf War after the United States 
applied a great deal of pressure.  When it became clear that Japan was not likely to 
contribute to the war effort, Dan Quayle, James Baker and other George H.W. Bush 
administration officials made strong statements regarding the Japanese position while 
visiting Japan.  Baker made the strongest comment, stating that the United States wanted 
to see Japan take a more global role, saying Japan had to “step forward as a leader in 
confronting global affairs.”12  This was an especially effective argument as Japan had a 
strong desire to gain a seat on the UN Security Council and would place that seat in 
9
 Bennett, et.al., 152
10
 Ibid., 144.
11
 Nitta, Keith.  “Paradigms.”  US-Japan Relations in a Changing World Ed. Steven K. Vogel (Washington, 
DC: Brookings, 2002). 81.
12
 Mann, Jim.  “Baker tells Japan: take global role.” LA Times, 11 November 1991.
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jeopardy if some action was not taken.13  Japan became involved because of the pressure 
that was placed on it, not because its interests were threatened.
By September 14, 1990, this pressure had a visible effect, and Japan pledged $4 
billion towards the war effort.14  This prompted Congress to pass a Congressional 
Resolution demanding that Japan make a physical contribution to the war and defray 
United States expenses by pledging a minimum of $9 billion more to the war effort.  If 
Japan did not do this, the United States would withdraw 5,000 troops a year from Japan, 
which would leave Japan to defend itself.15  In March of 1991, Japan pledged the extra $9 
billion that the United States requested to avoid provoking its protector and largest 
trading partner, not because of any interest in involving itself internationally.16  Japan 
provided an additional $4 billion in humanitarian aid to those affected by the war.  
Instead of providing rear-echelon assistance, which it was capable of, Japan wrote the 
check for the war.
Though this appears to be a significant contribution to the war effort, it was not 
so.  One economist has theorized that Japan knew it would eventually get back the money 
it had donated.  Japan needed to cut spending and taxes in the short run to pay the money, 
but in the long run, the drop in oil prices that would occur as a result of the war would 
lead to a savings of $19.7 billion by Japan.17  Even though its oil interests were at greater 
risk than the United States, Japan’s contribution was dwarfed by the $63 billion that the 
United States spent, and the $100 billion that other countries donated.18  Japan’s 
13
 Bennett, et.al., 148.
14
 Ibid., 143.
15
 Ibid., 148
16
 Ibid., 150.
17
 Howard, Lucy and Ned Zeman.  “A ‘Sacrifice.’” Newsweek, 18 March 1991.
18
 Hirano, Minoru.  “Behind the scenes.” The Daily Yomiuri, 20 September 1991.  It should be noted that 
Japan was one of the largest financial contributors to the war outside of the Middle East.
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reluctance to become involved in international war efforts, led them to contribute much 
less to a war that benefited them more than the war’s main contributor.  
One of the major criticisms of Japan in the Gulf War was that it did not use its 
diplomatic resources to further the war effort.19  The prime minister visited Egypt, Jordan 
and Turkey before the war began and later met with the Iraqi Defense Minister, but little 
was accomplished at these meetings, as he provided weak support for the coalition and 
did not strongly condemn Iraq’s action.20  As time passed, Japan became a much stronger 
ally to the coalition forces by allying itself even more strongly with the United States.21
Despite this strong alignment, and support of the coalition, Japan “gave up an opportunity 
to play a stronger diplomatic role”22 in the Gulf War by cutting its diplomatic support 
after that initial flurry.  Japan made only a minor diplomatic contribution to the Persian 
Gulf War.
For the last 50 years, Japan has operated under a constitution that outlaws war and 
arms.23  A reinterpretation of Article 9 of that constitution set up a defense force (SDF) 
that was intended for defense only, and was not allowed to go overseas or deal with 
perceived threats to Japan.24  Even though Prime Minister Kaifu and the “hawks” of the 
LDP supported a military role for the SDF during the Gulf War, any such involvement 
was rejected by the Diet and ruled as unconstitutional by the Japanese legal system as it 
would have represented collective security as opposed to collective self defense.25  At the 
19
 Ikeya, Akira.
20
 Bennett, et.al., 138.
21
 Ibid., 140.
22
 Ibid., 139.
23
 Ikeya, Akira.
24
 Ibid.
25
 Bennett, et.al., 148. The distinction between these two ideas, made clear in the introduction, is crucial to 
understanding the legality of Japanese actions abroad in security efforts.  The interpretations and 
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time, the LDP was beginning to show signs of its collapse that would occur several years 
later, which, combined with the fact that Kaifu was not even the leader of the minor 
faction of the LDP that he came from, his opinion and the power of the “hawks” of the 
LDP carried little weight in the party.26
Thus, Japan decided to make no military contribution to the Gulf War, and even 
had difficulty making civilian contributions.  Bills were introduced to the Diet to create a 
Peace Cooperation Corps that would be allowed to go to the Middle East, armed with 
only sidearms, to help in administering the peace.  However, the bill was withdrawn from 
the Diet when no one volunteered for the group.27  The only military support that Japan 
provided was to send six minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the war was over.28
Japan took a great deal of heat from the international community for this because many 
countries felt that Japan should have made a manpower contribution since its interests 
were more threatened than the United States’.29
In sum, Japan’s contribution to the Persian Gulf War was limited largely to a 
monetary donation to the United States.  Though Japan’s economic security was 
threatened by its oil dependency, Japan banked on its historical ability to weather such a 
storm.  Diplomatically, Japan made a small effort and in terms of military support, it 
provided no rear-echelon support and services though many contend it should have.  This 
indicates that the first response Japan will have to an international security dilemma will 
be to use its economic prowess to attempt to ensure for its security.  Based on its response 
reinterpretations of Article 9 and the definitions of these two terms are an important factor in debates about 
overseas deployment
26
 Ibid., 155.
27
 Ibid., 142.
28
 Ibid., 158.
29
 Hayao, Kenji.  “Decline of the LDP Hegemony.” Lecture 18 October 2002.
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to this dilemma, Japan will then proceed to rely on the United States to protect its 
interests, both direct and indirect after its economic response.
September 11
Unlike its response to the Persian Gulf War, when terrorists attacked the United 
States on September 11, 2001 Japan rushed to the aid of the United States before any 
political pressure was applied.  Japan took several groundbreaking steps to provide 
support for the United States through special legislation allowing for rear-echelon 
military support.  These steps were significant in their departure from previous Japanese 
security policy, but were still largely symbolic measures in support of a close ally.  The 
trend created indicates that Japan will become more involved in international security, 
but there are still real limits to the type and extent of support that will be provided.
One of the factors influencing an immediate Japanese response was that Japan felt 
that it had been internationally humiliated following the Gulf War and did not want to 
experience such humiliation again.30  However, the Japanese responded mainly for 
another reason, for, as Koizumi stated on 9/14/01, “the terrorist attacks are a challenge 
not just to the US, but also to freedom, peace and democracy.”31  To provide immediate 
aid, Japan formed rescue teams that they intended to send to the World Trade Centers if 
needed32, and began to carefully check all immigration records prior to and after the 
terrorist attacks.33   The Japanese people were clearly in support of strong action being 
30
 Wehrfritz, George and Hideko Takayama.  “Bringing up the rear.” Newsweek, 15 October 2001.
31
 Ikeya, Akira.  “Koizumi faces policy bind in backing US reform.” The Nikkei Weekly, 27 September 
2001.
32
 Ibid.
33
 See Murikami, Matsuko.  “High risk reform.” Asiaweek, 5 October 2001. and “Report: 12 suspected 
followers of Osama bin Laden entered Japan before US attacks.” Associated Press Worldstream, 16 
September 2001.
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taken as Koizumi’s approval rating soared from 59% to 79% immediately after he began 
to actively support the United States and take a hard line stance on terrorism.34
Japan also took measures to ensure the safety of potential, domestic, terrorist 
targets by restricting air space around major cities and by increasing patrols of US 
military installations after they were cited as possible terrorist targets.35  These measures 
showed Japanese support for the United States by adopting the US stance on terrorism, 
marking a difference from Gulf War politics when Japan took several weeks to adopt the 
US position, but were still largely symbolic as they did nothing to combat terrorism at its 
roots.  
Japan had taken some economic measures to aid in the Persian Gulf War effort 
after pressure was applied by the Bush administration, but it was limited to freezing 
Kuwaiti assets that were held by Japan, which prevented their access by Iraq, and then by 
enforcing UN sanctions.36  This helped to prevent Iraq from obtaining the money it 
needed to be successful in its operations and control of Kuwait.  Similarly, after 
September 11, Japan took economic action against terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, again 
using its economic power as its first step in ensuring its safety.  By October 1, 2001, 
Japan had frozen the assets of 50 groups or individuals with terror links, a number which 
expanded to 165 by November 1, 2001.37  In April of 2002, Japan combined with the 
other G8 countries to freeze the assets of 9 individuals and one group believed to be 
supporting terrorism.38  Japan further supported the United States in this effort to freeze 
34
 Ikeya, Akira.  “Koizumi faces policy bind in backing US reform.” The Nikkei Weekly, 27 September 
2001.
35
 Ibid.
36
 Bennett, et.al., 147.
37
 “Japan and EU take measures in response to terrorist attacks on US.” Transnational Law Associates, 
November 2001.
38
 “G-7 nations to jointly freeze terrorist funds.” Jiji Press Ticker Service, 19 April 2002.
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the funds of terrorists by making accessible the records compiled by their many 
international banking houses.39  This was a major action in the international effort against 
terrorism since terrorists could not operate without funding.
The other area in which the United States pressured Japan to act economically 
against terror was in requesting that Japan try to make every possible attempt to emerge 
from the recession that effectively began in 1989 when the market crashed.40  This was 
thought to be important because if Japan did not recover and once again become the 
economic power of Asia, that role could be assumed by China, a country more 
sympathetic to terrorism.41  To reach these lofty goals, Koizumi has attempted to take a 
major step by cleaning up the non-performing loans that will effectively destroy the 
Japanese banking system in three years time.42  He proposed frequent, tough inspections 
of banking, but some question the legitimacy of such policies as Japanese banks have 
written off $600 billion in loans since 1992.43  Also, Japan provided $120 million in 
refugee assistance to Pakistan prior to 11/1/01 as part of the UN, along with another $40 
million in refugee aid in a bi-lateral action with the United States.44  These actions 
indicate an understanding by the Japan that it must be a dominant economic power in 
Asia to influence the countries around it, thereby exerting an anti-terrorist influence and 
continues the trend of using economic policy to provide for security.
However, Japan did not squander its diplomatic opportunities as it had ten years 
earlier in its response to the events of September 11.  Iran was seen as a strategic country 
39
 Shibata, Gaku.  “SDF logistic support not enough: US wants Japan to use diplomacy.” The Daily 
Yomiuri, 3 October 2001. 22.
40
 Ibid., 13.
41
 Ibid., 13.
42
 Ibid., 13.
43
 Ibid., 13
44
 “Japan and EU take measures in response to terrorist attacks on US.”
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in the struggle against terrorism because of its long border with Afghanistan, and since 
the United States and Iran have no relations, Japan served as a go between.45  Due to their 
investment in Iranian oil fields, Japan had maintained relations with Iran, and was 
instructed to offer Iran aid if they either supported the US initiative against terrorism, or 
if they remained neutral.46  To this end, Japan sent Foreign Minister Komura to meet with 
Iran’s foreign minister and president.  Such an agreement was effectively obtained when 
Iran agreed to participate under the United Nations, though it would not go so far as to 
agree with the United States position in the war.47  Japan was also able to negotiate 
agreements on the treatment of refugees from Afghanistan, a major concern of the Iranian 
leadership.48
These negotiations with Iran were not without benefit to Japan.  Prior to the war 
in Afghanistan, Japan had negotiated a $12 billion package of oil deals with Iran but had 
not signed them.  Japan’s negotiations with Iran, while valuable to the United States, 
ensured Japan of the successful signing of those agreements and “a steady flow of oil 
throughout America’s military campaign.”49  Japan’s involvement represents less a 
commitment to international security and more a recognition that its own interests can be 
pursued in conjunction with increased cooperation with its major allies.  Not only was 
Japan aiding its security partner, it was protecting its own economic interests through this 
diplomatic effort.  Japan’s support was more self-motivated than it would otherwise seem 
with respect to September 11.  This was, however, a significant step as Japan did not 
45
 Shibata, Gaku.  “Japan to intercede with Iran on behalf of US.” The Daily Yomiuri, 27 September 2001.
46
 Ibid.
47
 “Komura meets Iranian minister on antiterrorism efforts.”  Japan Economic Newswire, 3 October 2001.
48
 Heginbotham, Eric and Richard Samuels.  “Japan” in eds., Richard Ellings and Aaron Friedberg, 
Strategic Asia: 2002-2003. (Seattle: NBR, 2003). 103
49
 Ibid., 104.
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even take such steps ten years earlier.  The argument that this was entirely for economic 
gains does not reflect the reality of the situation.
Komura solicited similar arrangements with Saudi Arabia and Jordan, proving 
that Japan was a key diplomatic ally to the United States following September 11 in 
gaining support for policies.50  In doing this, Japan was assuming a greater role in
ensuring international security by soliciting support and helping to build coalitions for the 
purpose of fighting terrorism.  Japan became such an active diplomatic player that it 
created a special ambassador to deal with terrorist issues and to take a lead role in the 
International Anti-Terror Network.51  Hiroshi Shigeta, the former ambassador to Israel, 
was chosen for the post of Terrorism Ambassador.  Since the position has been created, 
Shigeta has met extensively with Israeli and Palestinian leaders to ease tensions in the 
Middle East.  During the Israeli occupation of Palestine in April 2002, Shigeta met with 
both countries, urging the Palestinians to arrest militants and sought the approval for a 
ceasefire.52  Japan took significant action and was crucial in diffusing these tensions in 
the Middle East, allowing for a more peaceful end to a conflict that could have 
transformed into a long, bloody conflict.  Through this post, Japan has taken a greater 
role in international security as it is now involved in solving conflicts between other 
nations, something it did not do prior to September 11. This role, with the exception of 
Iran, was without direct economic gain to Japan and represents an increased inclination of 
Japan to provide diplomatic support for international security efforts.
50
 “Komura meets with Saudi Prince Sultan over terror response.” Japan Economic Newswire, 2 October 
2001.
51
 “Japan creates antiterrorism ambassadorial post.” Kyodo News Service, 11 May 2002.
52
 “Japanese envoy urges Israel to follow UN resolution.” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 10 April 2002.
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This trend can also be seen in the reconstruction process in Afghanistan.   
Following the Gulf War, Japan was frozen out of the Kuwaiti reconstruction process and 
was able only to offer its condolences and congratulations.53  This angered the 
international community, who felt that Japan needed to give a “clear political 
commitment” to the cause.54  Japan did not make this mistake again following September 
11 when it went so far as to offer to host a conference to rebuild the Afghanistan, and 
ended up co-chairing a conference with the United States in Washington DC.55 By co-
chairing this committee, Japan has involved itself in setting up governments and creating 
peace agreements aimed at preventing the spread of war and terrorism, something it did 
not do after the Gulf War.
Though Japan failed to provide front line military support for the war on terror, it 
took a significant step towards normalizing the SDF by providing direct, rear-echelon 
support for the United States and its allies. With the events of September 11, Japan was 
faced with the problem of what to do with SDF.  US bases and ships in Japan were a 
potential terrorist target, yet it was illegal for the SDF to escort US ships in Japanese 
waters, or to defend US bases against terrorist attacks even though they were in Japanese 
territories.56  Not wanting to repeat its mistakes of the Gulf War, Japan wished to make 
some military contribution to the war against terrorism.57  On 9/30/01 Japan began to 
deploy its military forces, sending MSDF vessels to the Indian Ocean to gather military 
intelligence.58  All information and intelligence that was gathered was shared with the 
53
 “Kuwait urges Japan to show political will.” Jiji Press Ticker, 8 March 1991.
54
 Ibid.
55
 “US to host Afghanistan reconstruction meet.” The Daily Yomiuri, 17 November 2001.
56
 “US aircraft carrier leaves Japan with naval escort.” BBC, 21 September 2001.
57
 “Time to think beyond Gulf War on security.”
58 Ikeya, Akira.
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United States for the explicit purpose of preparing for the war on terrorism that soon 
ensued.59  This represents Japan beginning to take action globally as Japan provided no 
such support for the United States during the Gulf War, but it was still a symbolic action 
as it provided neither weapons nor soldiers to the war effort.
Such action was supported by Koizumi, who recognized the impossibility under 
the Japanese constitution of providing the logistical support that the United States 
required.60  To solve this problem, the Diet passed the Anti- Terrorism Special Measures 
Law on October 29, 2001 which pledged support for six months, but could be extended 
for up to two years.61  This law took several measures, allowing for the use of the SDF to 
provide logistical support, participation in search and rescue operations for foreign 
forces, providing relief to those affected by the war and protecting any US military forces 
in Japan or its waters.62  In practice, this meant that Japan sent its destroyers along with 
1000 men to the Indian Ocean to support naval efforts by the United States and Great 
Britain.63  Japan provided the two naval forces with nearly 40% of their fuel during their 
operations in those areas since September 11.64  Also, Japan sent ASDF planes to 
Pakistan to aid refugees of the war in Afghanistan.65  Though support was originally 
pledged for six months, it was eventually extended to last until 11/19/02 to aid in the 
continuing war on terrorism and was extended for another six months in November 
2002.66 As a part of this act, the SDF was allowed to engage enemies that either 
59
 Ibid.
60
 “Time to think beyond Gulf War on security.”
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 “Japan and EU take measures in response to terrorist attacks on US.”
62
 Ibid.
63
 “Japan can give support to US attack against Iraq.” Xinhau News Service, 11 September 2002.
64
 Ibid.
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 Shibata, Gaku. “Japan to intercede with Iran on behalf of US.”
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 Jianjun, Han.  “Roundup: Sept. 11 attacks render Japan chance to expand military role.” Xinhau General 
News Service, 8 September 2002.
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threatened or represented a threat to Japan or its allies, and the coast guard was allowed 
to escort and provide protection to military vessels and open fire on anyone threatening 
them, which occurred when Japan began escorting the USS Kitty Hawk out of Japanese 
waters.67  Internally this law meant that the SDF was allowed to step up protection of 
both nuclear plants and US army bases as they represented possible terrorist targets.68
Though this is a major shift from previous policy, there are still some real limits on 
Japan’s contributions.
Limits of Japanese Involvement
As the previous section outlined, Japan steps have been taken towards increased 
participation in international security efforts, but there are still limits to how far Japan 
will go.  If Japan were serious about increasing its role in international security matters, it 
would have to amend its legal structure even farther to allow for different kinds of 
participation.  In point of fact, Japan does not appear ready to provide front line military 
support. 
This hesitancy to provide front line support is also borne out by the Japanese 
public in public opinion polls.  Following September 11, 87% of the population favored 
providing logistical and medical support, while 56 % wished to aid the United States in 
intelligence gathering.69  Meanwhile, 41% of the population wanted a reinterpretation of 
the constitution in order to allow SDF forces to take on a greater role internationally, so 
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long as it did not involve front line military action in foreign wars.70  In short, the people 
wanted to provide support to the United States and the coalition to fight terrorism, so long 
as it did not mean providing front line support to that effort.  The symbolic role of 
providing only rear-echelon support was favored by the people, but still served as a
barrier to Japan taking on a greater role in the future.  If the people do not support an 
increased role of providing front line support, it seems highly unlikely that the 
government would allow the SDF to take that role.  Thus, it is unlikely that Japan will 
take on a non-symbolic role in the foreseeable future as there is a strong internal barrier, 
in the form of public opinion, to such a role.
Factors Creating Different Responses
There are significant differences between Japan’s response to the Persian Gulf 
War and to the war on terror.  This raises the question of why the response to the two 
situations was so different.  The following will outline some of the differences that 
contributed to a different response.  While it could be argued that leadership, economics 
and alliance maintenance were the driving forces, a confluence of unique domestic 
factors helped to shape Japan’s response and change its fundamental security posture in 
the war on terror.
Japan’s participation in the war on terror cannot be solely attributed to a desire to 
aid the United States and stronger leadership.  Japan did have strong leadership during 
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the war on terror, as Junichiro Koizumi possessed a great deal of political capital.71  The 
hawkish Koizumi differed greatly from Kaifu, who provided no strong leadership during 
the Gulf War and who was dependent on the LDP which lacked a majority in one of the 
Diet houses.72  Though it is undoubtedly true that leadership had some effect, it is 
difficult to believe that he single-handedly reversed the process of socialization against a 
military role for the SDF that has developed out of Article 9.73
In the period between the Persian Gulf War and the War on Terror, Japan passed a 
series of laws allowing for SDF participation in UN peacekeeping activity, as long as the 
SDF’s role was peaceful, which set a precedent for the use of the SDF in a military role.74
In June 1992, the Diet passed the International Peace Cooperation Law allowing the SDF 
to be sent abroad to participate in non-combat UN peacekeeping missions.75  This bill 
was highly controversial and took nearly nine months to pass the Diet.76  At issue were 
the limits in weapons use that many politicians saw as placing the SDF at danger and the 
issue of an ambiguous relationship between the SDF and the UN command.77
Several qualifications were associated with the law, known as the Five 
Participation Principles.  These principles put severe limitations on Japan’s ability to 
contribute to PKO by stipulating that there must be: 1) a pre-existing and enforced 
ceasefire; 2) consent from all parties involved; 3) the PKO must be strictly impartial; 4) if 
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there is a change in principle 1-3, Japan will withdraw; 5) peacekeepers must use a 
minimum force doctrine, using weapons in self-defense only when directly ordered to do 
so.78  These rules of participation inhibit Japan’s ability to contribute to international 
security efforts as it cannot perform the ‘core’ duties of UN peacekeeping, but did lay the 
groundwork for future change.
The first manifestation of this new law occurred late in 1993 when Japan sent 
SDF personnel to Cambodia to administer a UN ceasefire.  The Diet initially approved 
the deployment of 1800 Japanese to Cambodia, a number close to the 2000 man limit set 
by the legislation.79  Though more troops were approved, Japan sent only a 1200-strong 
engineering unit to “maintain and repair roads and bridges; water supply and transport of 
materials.”80  It was significant as it represented the first time Japan had deployed the 
SDF in a significant role since World War II.
Soon after these troops were deployed, two civilian police officers that went to 
monitor the ceasefire were killed and several more injured.81  This raised immediate 
doubt within both the government and the populace, and some argued that the SDF 
should be pulled out.  “Nobody proposed going to the extent of shedding blood,” said 
then Minister of Posts and Telecommunications Koizumi.  He then continued, “anyway, 
contributions involving bloodshed should be ruled out.”82  Two deaths of Japanese 
citizens in a peacekeeping operation led the government, and Koizumi especially, to shy 
away from combat situations. However, Japan continued its participation in the 
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peacekeeping operation even after the two deaths and these proposals.83  This does raise 
some doubt as to how far Japan will actually go in its contributions to international 
security given that only ten years ago, its Prime Minister was strongly against the 
shedding of Japanese blood overseas.
However, Japan has continued to contribute to PKO even after the fallout from 
deaths in Cambodia.  “Japan has long promoted the United Nations as the hub around 
which the world should revolve,” and as such has not completely withdrawn its support.84
Japan’s most prominent PKO role since Cambodia was in East Timor where it sent 
peacekeepers in 2002 to provide rear-echelon logistical support as well as command and 
control structures.85  That development will allow Japan to participate more fluidly in the 
future as it has experience with international norms and integration of forces doctrines.  
The groundwork for levels of participation and the ability to provide logistical support 
were laid by involvement with the United Nations.  Recently, they have been applied to 
more intense combat situations as opposed to regions where the peace was already 
secured.
A third factor that has changed since the Persian Gulf War is that regional powers, 
such as the Koreas and China, are less anxious regarding Japan’s true intentions in the 
region and the world.86  Asian gaiatsu, or foreign pressure, had been a major factor 
preventing Japan form normalizing its security posture through the last fifty years. Japan, 
which has an acute sensitivity to its security environment, had previously withheld 
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support because of this opposition.87  Both of these countries and their peoples have been 
wary of Japanese military actions because of the atrocities that it committed during 
World War II.88  That sentiment was put into words by a South Korean news service that 
said, “Suspicion that Japan may use the terrorism case to promote their military 
expansionism makes their neighboring countries feel uneasy again.”89  This shows that 
there is still opposition by the people and governments of Asia to Japan providing 
international military support even though they made an allowance for Japan to take part 
in the war on terrorism. 
After September 11, that opposition was tempered as both countries allied 
themselves with the United States in the war on terrorism and did not want to interfere 
with that alliance, as discussed above.90  Nearly all countries are against terrorism, China 
and South Korea included, so they were more amenable to Japan providing support.  
However, they did release a joint statement to Japan urging for “responsible action” with 
respect to the use of the SDF, while also urging that Japan reflect on its actions in the past 
before taking drastic action.91  Though this does represent an increased acceptance of a 
Japanese military role within the international community, it has limited application due 
to the unusual circumstances that existed.
This increased participation by Japan is directly aligned with a shift in Japanese 
public opinion, which underwent a drastic change during the Gulf War.  Initially, 80% of 
the population was against deploying the SDF abroad, indicating that the people were 
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largely against the war and any Japanese contribution to it.92  By the end of the war, 70% 
of the population supported the $9 billion that Japan had contributed with 56% 
supporting the military effort against Iraq.93  In conjunction with this, a little over half of 
those surveyed supported seeing the SDF deployed internationally, with only 41% of the 
population supporting a strict interpretation of the constitution with regards to the SDF.94
In short, the views of the Japanese people had shifted because of the Gulf War, and they 
had begun to support Japan’s involvement in international security efforts by sending the 
SDF abroad to provide rear-echelon support.  
Beyond a recent history of participation in rear- echelon support efforts, the threat 
that was manifested on September 11 is one that strikes the heart of the Japanese culture.  
The most important factor in Japan’s response to September 11 is the sarin gas attack on 
the Tokyo subways on March 20, 1995, launched by the AUM Shinrikyo terrorist group.  
Before this attack, terrorism had seemed irrelevant to Japan, despite the fact that it had 
experienced several terrorist incidents in the 1970’s, and this single attack forced both the 
government and the populace to rethink their positions. 95  Terrorism has a strong 
domestic resonance in Japan.
The sarin attack of 1995 killed 11, and injured thousands in Tokyo.  More 
importantly it served as a watershed event that made terrorism a real threat to the 
Japanese people.96  This perceived threat proved to be warranted several weeks later 
when the Japanese police raided an AUM facility.  In the initial raid, the police found 
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nearly 2 tons of chemicals needed to construct chemical weapons and evidence that 
weaponized chemicals had already been moved.97  A second compound was raided days 
later, and police found enough weaponized sarin gas there to kill 4-10 million Japanese.98
Japanese society was not safe, and terrorists maintained the capability to inflict massive 
casualties on Japanese population centers.
At the time of these raids, police acknowledged that they did not find all of 
AUM’s chemical weapons capabilities and that AUM maintained the financial support 
necessary to replenish their stores.99  This proved prophetic, when, several months later, a 
second attempt was made to carry out terrorist attacks on Japan.  Police found cyanide in 
the Shinjuku train station before it had been combined into its weaponized form.  It is 
estimated that 10-20,000 people would have died had the cyanide not been found.100
Thus Japan was highly susceptible to terrorist attacks, and could relate to the United 
States as it began to cope and strike back at terrorists.
These attacks forced Japan to recognize that it remained prone to terrorist attacks 
from AUM and other groups.  In response to this threat, it created a secretary for crisis 
management and allowed the SDF and National Police Agency to increase their 
capabilities for fighting terrorist groups and managing bio-terror.101  The NPA increased 
its intelligence abilities and created special assault teams, and the SDF established a 
center to research biochemical weapons.102  In addition, the SDF created special response 
teams to deal with terror attacks.  These steps indicate that Japan saw it was a target for 
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terrorism and would continue to be a target in the future.  Long before the September 11 
attacks, Japan recognized its vulnerabilities and had begun to act on them.  Participation 
in the US led war on terror was the foreign policy extension of pre-existing domestic 
policies in Japan.
A further connection between the sarin attacks in Japan and the Al Qaeda attacks 
is the similarities between the two terrorist groups.  AUM, like Al Qaeda, was an anti-
western democracy organization with a quasi-religious justification for its terrorist 
acts.103 Unlike Al Qaeda, AUM had a doomsday philosophy and had advanced much 
further in their bio-chemical capabilities.104  Ironically, AUM remains the first and only 
“ultraterrorist group,” a terrorist group that possessed and used chemical and biological 
weapons.105  Like the United States, Japan has fallen victim to a terrorist group that used 
its ideology to attack the very basis that a country was founded on.  One of the reasons 
for the strong reaction from Japan could be that it had experienced more serious attacks 
than the United States and sought to avoid even more attacks as a result of a strong 
strategic alliance between the two countries.
As shown by polls taken just prior to the AUM attack and several months 
afterwards, the Japanese people became less convinced of both the stability and safety of 
their society because of the attacks.  The respective polls showed a drop of 9% in those 
feeling the country was stable, and 11% in those believing the country was safe.106
Terrorism, posed a credible threat to Japan even in 1995, seven years prior to the terrorist 
attacks on the United States.  This means that terrorism was something Japan could relate 
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to much more readily than a war in the Middle East as history had taught Japan that it 
could weather the negative effects of such a war.  Thus, one of the reasons that Japan 
reacted differently was that the circumstances of the terrorist attacks was different, and 
Japan could relate to the threat better.  The threat had stronger domestic resonance in 
Japan and thus evoked a stronger response.
That concept is reflected in public opinion polls taken in Japan soon after the 
September 11 attacks.  Nearly 60% of respondents stated that they no longer felt safe in 
Japan, up from the 44% who felt the same way after the AUM Shinrikyo attacks in 
1995.107  Unlike the Persian Gulf War, September 11 directly affected the people of 
Japan, as evidenced by the majority of people not feeling safe in their own country.  They 
were not removed from the threat and the action, but they had been through terrorist 
attacks in the past.  This illustrates the major difference between the Persian Gulf War 
and the terrorist attacks of September 11.
The situation of the Gulf War and September 11 also differed in another way, that 
being that the United States and other countries requested only rear-echelon support and 
did not seek front line support as they had done previously.  During the Gulf War, many 
countries had been angry that Japan did not share the “real risk” of providing front line 
support.108  After September 11, the United States and Great Britain provided the soldiers 
and sought only logistical support to their efforts.109  This is another significant difference 
between the two situations and is perhaps another reason why Japan responded more 
strongly; it knew it would not be called upon to violate the ideals that are voiced in its 
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constitution.  This has allowed Japan to provide support of international security efforts, 
though that support is symbolic and most likely unique to the situation. 
Japan’s actions following the events of September 11, 2001 certainly do represent 
a desire by Japan to take on a greater role in international security with respect to 
economic sanctions and diplomacy as there is now a precedent for economic action and 
Japan has laid the groundwork for increased diplomatic support.  Japan provided military 
support because there was a threat that was realized on the domestic level.  The 
asymmetric threat posed by terrorism had existed for years, as evidenced by the AUM 
attacks, but it was not until another attack actually occurred that Japan responded 
militarily.  This reveals a complex interdependence of international and domestic factors 
influencing Japan’s security policy and, more largely, its role in international security.  
This comparison indicates that Japan will act militarily when there is an issue that poses a 
significant geostrategic threat to Japan that has significant domestic resonance.  This 
trend will become more evident as the case of North Korea is examined and will even 
prove true when examining the current situation in Iraq due to the interdependence 
between those two security dilemmas, something that will be demonstrated in the balance 
of this paper.
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Chapter 2: 
Background on Japan-North Korean Relations
34
Through its history, North Korea has been known as the “hermit kingdom,” 
reflecting both its isolation and relative weakness in the international community.  It has 
proven to be next to impossible to negotiate with and pursues what are, to outsiders, 
strange strategies and tactics to achieve its goals.110  The process of negotiation and North 
Korea’s manipulation of a negotiating situation are one of the few things that make it 
important in the international system.111  These factors combine to make North Korea 
unpredictable and difficult to negotiate with.
The factor that makes North Korea most unpredictable is that it is one of the few 
countries centered entirely around one man, Kim Jong Il.112  “They absolutize, defend, 
and safeguard the Leader ideologically, they carry out the Leader’s teachings 
unconditionally to the last, and they dedicate their entire being to the Leader to ease the 
worries of the Leader.”113  North Korea is the only country in the world with the domestic 
control necessary to carry out such a strategy of promoting and protecting the survival of 
one man through its diplomatic encounters.114
This is a threatening arrangement to regional powers because Kim Jong Il himself 
is regarded as unstable and unpredictable.  Before coming to power, he was viewed as a 
“cruel, vain playboy- a lover of fast cars, beautiful women, expensive brandy and the 
fantasy world of filmmaking.”115  It was claimed that his birth was accompanied by
double rainbows and bright stars, when in reality he was born in the Soviet Union on an 
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army base where his father served while fighting Japan in World War II.116  Kim lives in 
a fantasy world, and there is a stark contrast between his perception of the world and 
reality.117  Despite this disconnect and unpredictability, he is regarded as highly 
intelligent and forward thinking.
He had the ability to charm Madeline Albright and South Korean leaders during 
their respective visits in the late 1990’s, while simultaneously allowing millions of North 
Koreans to die from preventable causes.118  Though data dissemination from North Korea 
is infrequent and often inaccurate, it is estimated that two million North Koreans died 
during a preventable famine in the mid-1990’s.119  The contradiction that is apparent in 
Kim is that he is highly intelligent and incredibly ruthless.  According to a former 
advisor, “as a dictator he has an excellent ability.  He can organize people so that they 
can’t move, can’t do anything, and he can keep them under his ideology.”120
According to Russian diplomats who met him on his only trip outside of North 
Korea, Kim is not a madman.  Everything that Kim does is well prepared, and there is a 
method to his madness.121  Kim plays a dangerous game of brinkmanship in order to gain 
concessions from the international community.  However, his unpredictability and the 
potential for unbalanced behavior is precisely what make his actions credible.  To pose a 
nuclear threat or to engage in effective brinkmanship, there must be an element of 
unpredictability in the action of leadership.  If there were no unpredictability, no one 
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would use nuclear weapons and they would pose no threat.122  This creates the credibility 
of a North Korean nuclear threat.  Even if other countries see ulterior motives behind 
proliferation, the threat must be respected because the leadership cannot be predicted.
In negotiations, North Korea attempts to control the process at all stages.123  It is a 
strategy rooted in the idea of Juche, which promotes taking charge of a situation and 
asserting North Korean importance.  Once this has been established, North Korea will 
carry out verbal assaults and make personal threats against foreign diplomats, essentially 
aimed at intimidation and forcing them to acquiesce to unreasonable demands.124  These 
threats are accompanied by North Korea’s attempt to create issue-specific, situational 
power to make up for its overall weakness.125  Over the long term, this reinforces the 
negative behavior of nuclear brinkmanship that has been consistently displayed by that 
country.
North Korea’s ultimate goal in entering into negotiations is to gain benefits and 
concessions, not a final agreement.  Its negotiating position is so weak that the 
advantages it receives come from the process, not the final outcome.126  North Korea 
defines a concession as “giving up one’s right or privilege to others,”127 to surrender.  
North Korea will first make personal threats and insults towards foreign diplomats to 
intimidate them into making favorable concessions.  It will then use obsequiousness and 
flattery to convince the naïve that the regime it represents is really being oppressed by the 
international community and is ill-treated.  It will portray itself as both the victor and the 
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victim with equal fervor, whichever it feels is more apt at a given point in time.128  This 
again relates back to the idea that North Korea displays inconsistent behavior and resorts 
to threats to force the issues that it finds to be of most critical importance.  In context, this 
could mean threatening Japan until it gave up economic concessions.
If these strategies do not force concessions, North Korea will rely on other 
measures, such as stalling and attempting to play adversaries in the negotiations off one 
another.  It tries to play on the weaknesses of the democratic system and its decentralized 
nature to create cracks in alliance structures.129  This is especially pertinent in the current 
situation, where Japan has allied itself with countries in a loose coalition with slightly 
different policy preferences.  If North Korea can create cracks in the consensus that these 
countries have created, it could easily divide them and gain the ‘concessions’ that it seeks 
from the process.  
According to Chuck Downs of AEI, negotiations proceed through three distinct 
and identifiable phases.  First, North Korea will agree in principle to the demands that it 
is given during the first round of talks.130  After several rounds of talks have been 
completed, it will enter the second phase when it reinterprets the agreement to suit its 
interests.131  Before the international community has a chance to move to condemn it, 
North Korea quickly blames the other parties for the failure of negotiations or the 
finalized agreement and shifts the blame away from itself.132  Between any of these 
phases, the expectations of North Korea’s adversaries are decreased because of their 
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failure, so any small gain, which really is no gain at all, appears to be a major victory.133
Long-term factors such as reputation are irrelevant to North Korea, which has openly 
supported terrorism for the second half of the twentieth century.134  Therefore, it is not 
averse to repeatedly pursuing the same course of behavior involving brinkmanship and 
holding the world hostage with its nuclear weapons since the long term constraints on 
similar actions by other states have no bearing on the North Korean psyche.
Even though any negotiation with North Korea is grim, international pressure has 
proven to be effective at curbing North Korea’s negative behaviors in the past.135
Western leaders have largely avoided confrontation of North Korea to prevent it from 
lashing out and taking action that could ultimately destroy its regime.  For example, 
South Korea has used the ‘Sunshine Policy,’ which has given direct aid to North Korea to 
encourage it to fully integrate itself into the international community.  Avoiding direct 
confrontation has allowed countries to prevent war and pursue peaceful accommodations 
even if they did not last.
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The Agreed Framework
Like it has done over the last year, North Korea used strategies of brinkmanship 
and nuclear blackmail to bring Asia to the brink of war from 1993-1994.  North Korea 
became one of the last countries to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty when it agreed to 
IAEA safeguards in 1992.136  Within a year, there were unavoidable signs that North 
Korea had violated its commitments and had started to reprocess nuclear materials.137
When these breaches were discovered by the IAEA, North Korea claimed it had no 
obligation to allow inspectors access to reprocessing sites, as they had not been 
specifically referenced in the initial agreements.138  Despite these transgressions, Japan 
assumed no diplomatic role and continued with the trend established during the Persian 
Gulf War of “checkbook diplomacy.”
In fact, North Korea claimed that any inspections would be contrary to its national 
interests and withdrew from the NPT in 1993, claiming that it would only negotiate an 
end to proliferation in bilateral talks with the United States.139  During those talks, North 
Korea said that it would suspend its nuclear program if it was given a lightwater nuclear 
reactor by the United States.140  However, talks broke down between the two sides and 
North Korea began to remove spent nuclear fuel rods from its reactor for reprocessing.141
Former United States President Jimmy Carter traveled to North Korea and guaranteed its 
leadership that the United States would provide it with a lightwater nuclear reactor and 
also that the United States would not take pre-emptive military action.142  During this 
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process, Japan took little or no role, and did not seek to expand the scope of the talks to 
include regional actors even though its security environment was negatively affected by 
the existence of weapons in North Korea. 143
The Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea made several 
promises.  It promised to provide North Korea with two light water reactors, and to 
supply North Korea with the heavy fuel needed to run those ‘proliferation proof’ 
reactors.144  The agreement also set up the Korean Energy Development Organization 
(KEDO), to supply North Korea with nuclear reactors and heavy fuel, and to provide 
economic aid.  As one of the principle members of KEDO, Japan made its most 
significant contribution towards curbing proliferation on the Korean peninsula.  Japan 
signed the agreement to create KEDO in 1995 with the United States and South Korea, 
and Japan’s financial contributions to KEDO have been key to its successful operation.145
Japan has been the second largest financial contributor to KEDO, with total donations of 
approximately $292 million, second only to the United States, which has donated 310 
million.146  These contributions have allowed KEDO to begin construction on both 
reactors and to supply North Korea with approximately 600,000 tons of fuel per 
annum.147
Even this essentially non-confrontational checkbook diplomacy has created 
problems with North Korea.  Supply of the light water reactors has seen several delays 
143
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due to fuel shipments falling behind and reactor design issues.  North Korea has 
displayed the phases of its agreement strategy in both changing its interpretation of its 
agreements and in trying to asses blame elsewhere.  In 1996, it landed a submarine in 
South Korea and paramilitary forces were unloaded.148  A second threatening move was 
taken in 1998, when it launched a missile over Japan.  Though the missile launch could 
be characterized as a failure, it still infringed on Japanese airspace and “locked North 
Korea into Japanese security thinking as a major threat to peace and security.”149  It 
caused the public to “reappraise the North Korean threat and to lower North Korea’s 
reputation as a negotiating partner.”150   Though “Japanese of all persuasions viewed it as 
provocative and threatening,” Japan’s only action was to delay shipments of heavy fuel to 
North Korea.151
North Korea has also contributed to these delays in other ways.  North Korea has 
stalled the process by refusing to accept the reactor design that was agreed to under the 
Agreed Framework, and construction and fuel shipments have not been significantly 
behind schedule.152  One of the justifications used for the current nuclear crisis is that 
KEDO fell behind schedule on both construction and shipment of oil.  Some analysts 
have argued that KEDO’s failures have degraded the North Korean economy and forced 
it to take aggressive action.153  This is a clear example of Japan using economic pressure 
to provide for its security.  
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The Agreed Framework was undeniably successful in halting nuclear reprocessing and 
the construction of new nuclear sites in North Korea.154 However, its failures have had 
dire consequences for Japan.  The agreement allowed North Korea to retain its fuel rods, 
one of the key factors in allowing it to reprocess nuclear materials today.155  The Agreed 
Framework also reinforced North Korea’s negative behavior and encouraged it to deceive 
the international community.156  Finally, the process of the Agreed Framework and 
KEDO has done nothing to curb North Korea’s missile program.157  Most importantly, 
Japan’s involvement is similar in most respects to its response to the Persian Gulf War 
than to the war on terror.  Japan pursued a policy of checkbook diplomacy by 
contributing to KEDO without participating in the discussions that led to the Agreed 
Framework.
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Chapter 3:
The Current North Korean Nuclear Crisis
Domestically driven security policy
44
The current crisis in North Korea reveals many similarities with the period from 
1993-1994 when the Agreed Framework was signed.  North Korea is again proliferating 
and testing missile technology and threatening regional stability.  Most notable to the 
current crisis is the fact that Japan has played a major diplomatic role, which it did not do 
ten years ago.  Even though the threat is the same, the Japanese response is significantly 
different.  There are two major factors that appear to influence this policy reorientation.  
First, the Japanese populace feels uniquely threatened by North Korean missiles, and 
secondly, the issue of abductions has received a great deal of play within Japan.  Just as 
in the war on terror, domestic factors have played a major role in influencing a security 
policy reorientation in Japan.
North Korea and WMD
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are most aptly defined as “weapons that 
differ radically in inherent lethality.  Lethality modes are terrible, both in terms of prompt 
and long-term effects.”158  Nuclear weapons fall under this definition, as do biological 
and chemical weapons and the means needed to deploy them.  Since the late 1980’s, both 
the CIA and Japanese intelligence services have believed that North Korea has developed 
these capabilities and may have even constructed several rudimentary weapons.  The 
program was publicly declared to have been dormant through much of the last fifteen 
years with the notable exception of the period from 1993-1994.  
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The North Korean nuclear program was secretly reconstituted in as early as 1997, 
and was aimed all along at brinkmanship and coercive diplomacy.159  In October 2002, 
North Korea admitted the existence of its WMD program during bilateral meetings with 
United States Assistant Secretary of State, Jim Kelly.  According to meeting participants, 
North Korea flaunted this program, clearly unaware that the United States already knew 
of its existence.160  During those meetings, North Korea claimed that it needed a nuclear 
deterrent to prevent the United States from pursuing a policy of regime change, citing 
Iraq as a major cause of concern to the Kim Jong il regime.  
Estimates as to the size and breadth of North Korea’s nuclear program show a 
great deal of variance.  The conventional assumption, supported by the United States 
intelligence community, is that North Korea has already produced two or three nuclear 
weapons.  However, the real number of weapons produced could be as high as five or 
six.161  The difficulty in assessing any estimates regarding this program is that it has not 
been monitored by the international community in nearly eight years, and there is a 
general difficulty in collecting any strategic intelligence about North Korea.  According 
to a member of the National Security Council speaking off the record, North Korea has 
based their weapons design on the use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) which is more 
volatile than more conventional plutonium designs, but more amenable to North Korea 
based on its resources.  Though North Korea has yet to finish construction on a plutonium 
reactor, such a development is not far off.
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Currently, North Korea is developing three separate nuclear reactors as part of its 
weapons program.162  Though they are claimed to be nuclear power plants, the United 
States and its allies believe that the claim is false since there are no power lines connected 
to these reactors.163  The conclusion that the United States has drawn is that the reactors 
are being used for some other purpose, namely for the production weapons grade 
plutonium and uranium that could be used to construct nuclear weapons.  
The first nuclear reactor is one that Japan has known about since the late 1980’s 
during the original nuclear standoff with North Korea.  This site at Yongbyon consists of 
a 5 MW nuclear reactor that is capable of producing 7 kg of highly enriched uranium per 
year.164  Production at this plant was halted from 1989 to 1993 and then from 1994-2002.  
Estimates on the actual amount of fissile material produced by this plant vary greatly 
based on how much plutonium was extracted during the year that it was in operation and 
on whether the 8000 nuclear fuel rods taken from this plant have been reprocessed.  From 
just this facility, North Korea could produce three nuclear bombs per year and a total of 
12 bombs in the next three years.165  Taken alone, this does not seem to pose that much of 
a threat to Japan.  North Korea would not have a large enough nuclear arsenal to create a 
significant strategic advantage in Northeast Asia, and it would not have a nuclear 
deterrent arsenal.
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However, North Korea has been secretly developing two other nuclear reactors 
over the last several years, which are still under construction.  Even though they are not 
likely to be completed until 2005, these sites represent the increasing potential of North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  The smaller of these two sites is a 50 MW nuclear 
reactor that could produce 70 kg of plutonium per year.166  The larger of the two reactors 
is a 200 MW reactor that could produce 130 kg of plutonium per year.  After the Japanese 
estimates on how much uranium it would take to make a bomb are extrapolated, this site 
could produce approximately twenty nuclear weapons per year.  It is larger than the other 
two sites combined and could produce nearly three times as many weapons per year.
North Korea may have also obtained the material needed to build nuclear 
weapons from other sources.  Though the Soviet Union admittedly trained North Korean 
scientists, it did not overtly provide North Korea with any fissile material.  However, 
there are allegations that North Korea may have smuggled 56 kg of plutonium out of the 
Soviet Union in the late 1980’s.167  That material would be enough for North Korea to 
build several nuclear weapons.  This is another reason for the variance in estimates as to 
the size and capability of the North Korean nuclear weapons program.
In sum, these nuclear plants could produce between 30 and 55 nuclear weapons 
per year.168  North Korea has been developing a concurrent nuclear testing program to 
weaponize its nuclear capabilities, located at Youngdoctong.169  North Korea has been
developing delivery systems and has conducted nuclear testing under the nose of the 
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international community for the last five years at this site.170  Though North Korea has 
detonated conventional weapons to simulate a nuclear weapon, it has not tested its 
nuclear device, one of the reasons why Japan still insists on peaceful engagement and 
opposes regime change.  The site is being used to work on combining North Korea’s 
conventional missile technology with its newly developed nuclear capabilities, which it 
could accomplish within one year.171  This would allow North Korea to develop a ladder 
of deterrence similar to that conceived of by American and Soviet strategists during the 
Cold War.  
This threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program is taken very seriously by the 
Japanese Defense Agency.  In a 1995 white paper, the JDA said, 
moves by North Korea have heightened military tensions on the Korean peninsula, which has thus 
become a seriously destabilizing element in the security of Japan and the rest of East Asia.172
Contrary to portions of the Japanese population, which feel that Japan lived with the 
threat of China and the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, the JDA feels that North 
Korea poses an immediate threat to Japan.  This makes it imperative that Japan act to 
counter the threat posed and ensure its territorial integrity and the safety of its population.
One of the concerns is that Japan does not have the ability to independently deter 
a North Korean nuclear attack.  Nuclear deterrence theory argues that a country must 
have a secure second strike to guarantee its defense.173  Noted Japanese defense analyst 
Matake Kamiya argues that even though Japan has the latent capabilities necessary to 
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developing its own deterrent, it does not have solid fueled missiles, and lacks submarines 
capable of securing a second strike and a nuclear triad.174  Without a deployed deterrent, 
Japan must rely on United States guarantees under its extended nuclear umbrella, which 
is not entirely reassuring.  With the end of the Cold War, the question arises whether the 
United States would be willing to trade one of its cities, Los Angeles perhaps, for 
Tokyo.175  This ambiguity leaves Japan in an unstable security environment.
Also, as the country to fall victim to a nuclear attack, Japan has developed a 
“nuclear allergy” over the last fifty years.176  Discussing the development of nuclear 
weapons, though more acceptable in the last five years, is still frowned upon in Japan.  
This makes it nearly impossible for Japan to develop nuclear weapons in the near future, 
though it could be driven to do so in extreme circumstances.177  Coupled with indefinite 
promises by the United States, this leaves Japan in a precarious position.
This program threatens Japanese interests beyond destabilizing Northeast Asia.  
The primary threat is that the weapons could be sold to terrorists.178  Japan has been the 
target of terrorist attacks in the past and it is a threat that is immediate and real to the 
Japanese people, as previously discussed.  If attacks were carried out against a major 
trading partner of Japan, such as the United States, it could destabilize an economy that 
has struggled through a prolonged recession.
The North Korean nuclear program clearly poses a significant threat to the 
Japanese security environment both directly and indirectly in potential economic 
consequences.  However, North Korea has had the ability to produce nuclear weapons 
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since the early 1990’s.  Furthermore, during the nuclear standoff of the early 1990’s, 
Japan did not try to involve itself directly in the process aimed at ending North Korea’s 
nuclear program.  Though North Korea refused to negotiate with any country other than 
the United States, it has made similar demands in the current nuclear crisis, and Japan has 
taken strong diplomatic action.  This begs the question of why Japan did not become 
involved in the process in 1993-1994 if it faced the same nuclear threat.
51
North Korean Missile Technologies and Capabilities
179
The threat posed by North Korean missiles is highly threatening to Japan since it 
is an island nation with concentrated centers of population and is thus easily targeted.180
North Korean intermediate range missiles are currently deployed to target Japanese 
population centers, threatening to draw Japan into any entanglement on the Korean 
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Peninsula.181 Until the early 1990’s, North Korea lacked the ability to strategically deploy 
any weapons that it could have created; it did not have a delivery system that could be 
counted on to deliver a payload to its intended target.182  Weapons of mass destruction are 
essentially useless to a state actor unless they can be effectively delivered; they are not 
overtly threatening in themselves. Though North Korean missile technologies have 
advanced significantly over the last ten years, it is only recently that they have become an 
issue that Japan has chosen to deal with.
Since the mid- 1980’s, North Korea has deployed a Scud-B missile based on early 
Soviet technology.183  This missile is capable of carrying a 1000 kg payload up to 300 
km.  Later in the 1980’s, North Korea began to deploy a Scud-C type missile that is 
capable of delivering a 700 kg payload up to 500 km.184  These missiles are both capable 
of hitting the coast of Japan armed with a nuclear payload.
In the late 1980’s, North Korea began to develop long-range missiles capable of 
carrying larger payloads.  The first class of missile developed during this period is the 
Nodong missile, which is capable of delivering a 1000 kg payload between 1000 and 
1300 km.185  This missile has the capability to target locations throughout Japan, with 
approximately 100 deployed and targeted at Japan today.186  Even though missile tests 
could be classified as failures, it is a threat that must be respected.187  The Nodong could 
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still be used in an act of desperation or to threaten neighbors.  It must be noted that North 
Korea has deployed a sufficient number of Nodong missiles to provide for its own 
defense, while maintaining reserves large enough to export missile technology to other
countries bent on missile proliferation.188  Regardless of its operational testing, Japanese 
defense analysts consider this design the greatest threat to Japan’s security based on 
range and potential payload.189
Finally, North Korea has taken serious steps to develop two and three stage 
missiles.  Termed Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2, these missiles are both based on the 
initial Nodong design that North Korea developed.  According to Selig Harrison of the 
Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., the North Korean missile program has 
been unnecessarily hurried to meet political objectives of the Kim Jong il regime.190  Like 
many analysts, Harrison feels that North Korea’s incentive in developing these missile 
systems is less to enhance its military capability and is instead aimed at coercing the 
international community to buy off its missile program in order to provide North Korea 
with the economic and security guarantees that it has sought since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1989.191  This is similar to the behavior that North Korea exhibited 
during its efforts at proliferation in the mid-1990’s, and could be representative of the 
exact same behavior.
itself is inherently flawed based due to an ineffective booster design.  The Nodong was not accurate when 
tested at half of its intended range, 500 km, meaning that it is not considered fully operational since North 
Korea cannot be assured it will achieve its desired purpose.
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There are serious doubts about the effectiveness of the missile because it is based 
on an ineffective design that would have structural difficulties during its boost phase and 
decreased missile range because of its weight.192  However, the threat posed by North 
Korean missile systems must be taken seriously even if there are major questions 
regarding effectiveness.  On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a Taepodong-1 
class missile over Japan, as discussed earlier in the chapter including the Agreed 
Framework.193  During that launch, the first stage of the missile detached before reaching 
Japan, landing to the west of the main islands.  The rest of the missile landed in the ocean 
to the east of Japan.194  Initially, North Korea provided no justification for this 
unprovoked launch, but later attempted to justify it as part of a space launch program.195
The missile range demonstrated by this launch came as a complete surprise to the 
international community and to Japan.196  The idea of a missile threat from North Korea 
had become part of the Japanese consciousness in 1993 and 1994 when North Korea 
tested its Scud-B and Nodong missiles, but prior to the 1998 test, the populace had 
favored engagement of North Korea as opposed to a hardline approach. 197
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Another aspect of the North Korean threat is that it has long supported its military 
spending by selling its technology to the highest bidder regardless of balance of power 
arrangements or potential destabilizing effects, threatening the interests of both the 
United States and Japan.198  In the past five years, North Korea has sold its Nodong 
technology to both Iran and Pakistan, rogue states with little concern for the long-term 
implications of their short-term planning.199  For instance, the Ghuari I missile recently 
tested by Iran bears a striking resemblance to the North Korean Nodong missile and is 
based on an identical missile design.200  Even though North Korean arms sales have 
dropped from approximately $400 billion per year in the 1980’s to $100 million per year 
in the late 1990’s, it is still a major concern since the drop in sales came more from a lack 
of demand rather than a move by North Korea to cut back.201
As of 1999, North Korea had sold an estimated 450 ballistic missiles to Middle 
Eastern countries.  200 were sold to Iran, while Syria bought 150 and Iraq 100.202  The 
major concern with these sales is that they upset delicate balances of power in the Middle 
East, a region in which Japan and the United States have sought to protect their oil 
interests by providing regional stability.  If the Middle East were disturbed, Japan could 
be faced with major oil shortages, spelling economic disaster.  As it emerges from a 
prolonged recession, Japanese industrial production would be in grave danger if oil 
shortages developed.  In Japan “economic security is at least as important as military 
security,” meaning that this is a serious threat to Japan’s security.203  Japan and the 
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United States have a major incentive to curb North Korea’s arms sales to protect its 
economy and to insure long-term viability.  Proliferation of missile technology not only 
directly threatens the Japanese islands, but it also destroys the strategic military balance 
in a region that is crucial to Japan’s economic vitality.204
Most significantly, this represents a domestic response to an external threat.  This 
was not present during the Agreed Framework period, and is one of the crucial subtleties 
that have prompted Japan to change its response to a nuclear North Korea from ten years 
ago.  At least part of Japan’s threat perception is driven by domestic concern regarding 
North Korea.  This is a stark contrast to the Agreed Framework period when the Japanese 
population did not respond to the external threat posed by North Korea.  This indicates 
the presence of domestic pressure can have a profound influence on when Japan acts.  
This was also born out by the war on terror, when Japan was seeking to protect its 
economic interests, in the form of oil interests, and to maintain a positive security 
relationship with the United States without fundamentally changing its security posture.
North Korean Aims
The argument most frequently forwarded regarding North Korea’s nuclear and 
missile programs is that it is developing a nuclear arsenal to save money.  North Korea 
currently has one of the largest conventional military forces in the world.205  Yearly 
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expenditures on that military, which were once as high as 20-25% of GDP but have 
dropped to 14%, leave a large percentage of the population without the basic services it 
needs for survival.  Cuts in defense spending would be beneficial to the economy, but to 
say that a nuclear arsenal would cut military spending or ease the percentage of GDP 
budgeted for the military is misleading.  
North Korea spends the majority of its military budget on manpower deployed 
along the demarcation line with South Korea.206  Even if it developed nuclear weapons, it 
would still have to man the border between the two countries, and would not be able to 
significantly downsize its manpower.  Secondly, North Korea does not have the 
necessary infrastructure to support its nuclear capability.  Its Air Force has only 80 planes 
capable of carrying nuclear weapons, which could easily be eliminated in a first strike 
counter-force attack.207  To develop a deterrent force, North Korea would have to 
increase its fighting capabilities which would require it to either buy hardware from 
abroad, or increase spending on research and development.  
As an alternative to developing its air force, North Korea could deploy nuclear 
weapons on its ballistic missiles, which faces major impediments as the missile design 
does not allow for a warhead of sufficient size.  A third alternative is to use submarines as 
the primary platform for missile deployment.  Though North Korea has 26 submarines, 
they are incapable of ensuring a secure second strike because of deficiencies in their 
aging submarine fleet.208  Saving money does not entirely account for North Korea’s 
206
 Cordesman, Anthony.  The Conventional Military Balance in China and Northeast Asia. (Washington 
DC: CSIS, 2000). 7
207
 Ibid., 5
208
 See NBR’s Strategic Asia Web Database.  (www.nbr.org); author’s off the record conversations with 
State Department and Defense Department officials.  North Korea does not have nuclear submarines 
capable of staying at sea for long periods undetected.  “No doubt some significant force degradation has 
occurred due to difficulties in obtaining spare parts, fuel, lubricants and other logistical requirements.” 
58
nuclear proliferation, as it faces difficulties in securing a second strike and in cutting back 
on manpower. 
An alternative justification that has been forwarded is that North Korea has 
developed a deterrent to counter the threat posed by the United States.  North Korea has 
several times stated that it “will step up efforts to strengthen its ‘nuclear deterrent 
capabilities’ in response to US pressure.”209  This implies that pressure from the United 
States existed before North Korea began to develop a nuclear force, which has already 
been demonstrated as incorrect as North Korea began proliferating as far back as 1997 or 
1998.  The United States was not pursuing a policy of pre-emption at that time, and as 
already discussed, was providing North Korea with significant economic aid.
North Korea is once again pursuing a policy of brinkmanship in order to achieve 
economic gains.  North Korea once depended on the Soviet Union as its primary trading 
partner, but since its collapse in 1989, “North Korea’s economy is failing and needs a 
major overhaul.”210  From 1990-1998, North Korea fell into the depths of depression, 
experiencing a 55% drop in GDP.211  Over that same period, foreign trade fell by nearly 
70% and North Korea fell farther and farther into debt.212  This has naturally been 
accompanied by a drop in consumer production, leading industrial production to function 
at only 25% of capacity.213  North Korea needs to find an external means to stimulate 
industrial production and promote economic growth.
Information on this point is generally classified, but intelligence sources felt hat North Korea cannot put its 
fleet to sea and thus cannot guarantee its second strike capabilities.
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Personal income in North Korea has languished over the last fifteen years as well.  
Household income is at an estimated $1000 per year, but is only $500 when adjusted for 
purchasing power parity.214 The North Korean population has experienced food shortages 
and rationing, and the monetary system has been reduced to bartering.215  Furthermore, 
the majority of North Korea’s energy comes from external sources, and a significant 
portion of its GDP is the result of foreign aid flows.216  North Korea is effectively 
dependent on neighboring states for its energy and economy.217  Brinkmanship provided 
North Korea the opportunity to engage regional states and coerce them into providing 
food, fuel and security.218  Stated intentions to build a nuclear deterrent or to transfer 
nuclear capabilities are merely an attempt to find what threatens neighboring states and 
leverage them into providing the concessions North Korea desires.219
Even though Japan’s economy has slowed in recent years, it is still capable of 
providing the incentives that North Korea is seeking.  Japan is currently North Korea’s 
second largest trade partner and has shown an interest in the peaceful resolution of the 
nuclear crisis.220  Japan has traditionally provided economic aid when it provides for the 
security of the Japanese islands, and has supported economic reform in South Korea.221
This could conceivably provide a perfect opportunity for Japan to participate in regional 
security by providing some of the estimated $2 billion per year North Korea requires for 
reform if its allies allow it to assume such a role.  
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Abductees: The Other North Korean Threat
The abduction issue is one that receives a great deal of attention in Japan.  It has 
been described by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
as one of the most serious issues concerning the lives of Japanese national and considers that the 
issue cannot be evaded in any way in normalizing the relations between Japan and North Korea.222
According to Mike Mochizuki and Mike O’Hanlon, Japan’s priorities are in line with 
those of Washington, but Japan is more concerned with “the fate of the Japanese 
kidnapped by North Korea.”223  Japan’s current animosity towards North Korea was not 
noticeable until after this issue came to the fore or public debate.224  Important as it has 
been in Japan, this issue lacks importance in the larger international community and has 
not received a great deal of coverage outside of Japan as it is largely a Japanese domestic 
issue.  Regardless, Japan has ensured that it is an essential item in any multilateral 
negotiations that take place with North Korea.
As early as 1992, Japanese officials began to suspect the North Korean 
government of abducting 13 Japanese nationals with the aim of turning them into spies.225
Japan initially accused North Korea of abducting one woman during talks to normalize 
diplomatic relations in 1991.  At the time, the issue of abductions proved to be a major 
stumbling block between the two states, and prevented normalization.226  Japan has 
reiterated a consistent stance over the last twelve years that the resolution of the 
abduction issue is intrinsically tied to the normalization of relations between the two 
countries.
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After several years of dormancy, the issue again came to the front in preparation 
for normalization talks in 1998.  At that time, Japan requested the Red Cross to 
investigate claims of abductions by North Korea.227  North Korea categorically denied the 
existence of any abductees and soon afterward conducted ballistic missile tests over 
Japan.228  North Korean officials accused Japan of slander after this investigation, saying 
“No Japanese missing person is in the DPRK.”229  It further accused Japan of trying to 
obstruct the normalization of ties between the two countries with a “groundless 
allegation.”230
In 1999, at the request of the Diet, North Korea agreed to look for the missing 
Japanese nationals as part of a “missing-persons investigation.”231  Japan’s National 
Police Agency (NPA) then submitted a list of the thirteen Japanese nationals it believed 
had been abducted by North Korea.  Japan reiterated that the “issue of the suspected 
abductions could not be skirted in seeking to improve the Japan-North Korea relations, 
pressing North Korea to respond in good faith.”232  By making this statement, Japan tied 
the resolution of the abduction issue to normalized relations between the two countries, 
something that North Korea has desperately been seeking in an effort to gain economic 
concessions from Japan and other regional powers.
In August 2000, “the North Korean side again dismissed the suspected abductions 
as impossible, insisting the issue should not be a topic at the Normalization Talks.”  A 
little more than a year later, North Korea ended the investigation into the abductees’ 
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whereabouts.233  North Korea covered its transgressions for nearly twenty years, 
misleading Japan by falsifying its investigation and by denying the presence of Japanese 
nationals that it had abducted.
However, North Korea has changed its stance on this issue in the last two years.  
After being confronted by Japan’s NPA in March 2002 with a list of 11 people suspected 
of being abducted, North Korea again balked.  In September 2002, North Korea 
“admitted it abducted all but one of the 11 Japanese on the agency’s list”234 just prior to a 
summit between Prime Minister Koizumi and Kim Jong Il.  Despite Kim’s apologies and 
assurances that such actions would not take place again, this admission was taken very 
seriously by the director of the National Police Agency, Hidehiko Sato.  Sato said, 
These abductions signify extremely important cases in which Japan’s territory was violated and 
people were taken outside their country.
In short, the abduction of Japanese nationals was viewed as an infringement on Japan’s 
territorial integrity and a direct threat to its citizens even though North Korea provided 
assurances that there would not be further abductions.  This still represents a significant 
threat posed by North Korea to the Japanese population that was not understood ten years 
ago.  This also appears to be a driving force behind Japan’s involvement in resolving the 
North Korean nuclear crisis.
Japan attempted to resolve this issue bilaterally by addressing it as the top issue in 
normalization talks in October 2002.235  It pursued an arrangement where the five 
surviving abductees could return to Japan and decide whether to stay or to return to North 
Korea.  Independent of that decision, North Korea would be required to guarantee the 
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safety of their families and either allow them to immigrate to Japan or to remain in North 
Korea.236  North Korea allowed the five abductees to visit Japan later in 2002, but Tokyo 
refused to return them to North Korea.237  North Korea has subsequently continued to 
hold their families captive and continues to withhold information on the abductees that 
did not survive.
Going into the 6 Party Talks on North Korean nuclear proliferation, Japan 
demanded that the families be returned to Japan before any attempts at normalized 
relations were made.238  Instead of improving relations between the two countries, the 
admission by North Korea has hampered progress on normalization because Japan wants 
North Korea to return the five families and account for the deaths of the eight other 
abductees.239 Resolution of this issue appears to be at the center of Japan’s involvement 
in the aforementioned 6 Party Talks which are aimed at curbing proliferation in North 
Korea.  Japan is concerned more with resolving what is essentially a domestic issue, than 
it is with addressing a threat to international security.
Public opinion in Japan strongly favors the resolution of this issue in the 6 Party 
Talks.  When asked whether the issue should be addressed bilaterally or as part of a 
larger agenda in a multilateral setting, 67% of Japanese citizens favored the multilateral 
setting.240  This may be attributed to overall pessimism surrounding the issue.  58% of 
respondents felt that the current government, which it recently re-elected, would be 
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unable to resolve the abductee issue unilaterally.241  This raises the question of whether 
Japan is involved in these talks as part of an increased commitment to providing for 
international security, or whether it recognizes an inability to deal with an issue that is 
important to Japanese voters and has allowed domestic pressures to influence its policy in 
the international community.
“On the issue of abductions, Japan appears to be non-negotiable;” to receive any 
concessions from Japan, North Korea must release the families of the abductees.242  It is 
significant to note that Japan was historically flexible on both the nuclear and missile 
issues.  Both of those geo-strategic threats have existed for more than five years, yet 
Japan has only attempted to engage North Korea on them as part of a larger framework 
aimed at resolving the abduction issue.243  On the issue of abductions, Japan immediately 
took a hardline approach after North Korea admitted responsibility that has been 
extended to both the current nuclear and missile issues.  Japan continued the pattern that 
emerged during the 1990’s and did not seek engagement of distinct military threats until 
an issue with significant domestic resonance was raised, at which point it became more 
aggressive diplomatically and sought alternative approaches.  Thus, Japan’s response to 
the abduction issue reflects many similarities to the war on terror in 2001.
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Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration
Japan, like many other countries, has not had diplomatic ties with North Korea 
since the Korean War.  In 1991, the two sides met to begin normalization talks, 
recognizing that they must have relations with one another in order to provide for 
regional security and to afford North Korea the economic benefits that can be derived 
from diplomatic relations with Japan.244  Japan has several objectives in any relationship 
it pursues with North Korea, the most important of which is the resolution of the 
abduction issue.245  Both sides would benefit significantly from formal relations, though 
they have been less than successful.
Over the last ten years, the two sides have held negotiations on normalization 
intermittently, but little progress has been made primarily due to the abductee issue. In a 
surprise move, Prime Minister Koizumi decided to visit North Korea to hold a summit 
with Kim Jong Il only days after North Korea admitted abducting Japanese citizens.  On 
September 17, 2002, the two leaders met and produced the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang 
Declaration.  This declaration was not intended to solve the contentious issues between 
the two countries, but merely to create a framework for future negotiation.246
Nonetheless it was a groundbreaking event in that it was the furthest the two countries 
had gone in the normalization process.
The wording of the declaration is vague and states policy goals that are 
ambiguous and ill-defined.  The first and second points in the agreement state that the 
two sides “would make every possible effort for an early normalization of relations, and 
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decided that they would resume the Japan-DPRK normalization talks in October 2002,” 
and that Japan would recognize the atrocities that it committed as a colonial power during 
World War II. This has been a contentious issue with other regional powers, such as 
China, but Japan had never conceded that much in the past.
Though the first two points were important, the third point provides the real focus 
of the declaration.  
Both sides confirmed that they would comply with international law and would not commit conducts 
threatening the security of the other side.  With respect to the outstanding issues of concern related to the 
lives and security of Japanese nationals, the DPRK side confirmed that it would take appropriate measures 
to that these regrettable incidents, that took place under the abnormal bilateral relationship would never 
happen in the future.
Though somewhat ambiguous, this reveals the true aim of any Japanese engagement of 
North Korea; it seeks to resolve the abduction issue.  This is an important idea as it has 
had significant ramifications in the recent North Korean nuclear crisis and is intrinsically 
linked to Japan’s policy reorientation in that situation.
The fourth point of the agreement is the most clearly violated point that the two 
leaders agreed upon in 2002.
Both sides confirmed that they would co-operate with each other in order to maintain and strengthen the 
peace and stability of North East Asia.  Both sides confirmed the importance of establishing co-operative 
relationships based upon mutual trust among countries concerned in the region.
Not only has North Korea already violated this agreement by announcing that it has 
nuclear weapons, something that it had stringently denied, it has destabilized the region 
and brought it closer to war by proliferating missile and nuclear technologies.247  North 
Korea violated almost all of the points agreed upon by the two leaders within months of 
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the declaration signing.  This declaration proved that North Korea is opaque and 
unpredictable, and that it cannot be trusted.248
The difficulty with that realization for Japan is that there is no way for it to 
engage North Korea if it refuses to be held to its commitments; adherence cannot be 
forced and North Korea’s credibility is destroyed.  Thus, Japan must operate through a 
multilateral framework that includes the United States to ensure greater potential for 
compliance by North Korea.  It is interesting to note that the greatest progress between 
the two countries in building productive relations occurred after a major domestic force 
was created in Japan through the abduction issue.  This agreement is more evidence to the 
trend that Japan largely ignored geostrategic imperatives resulting from the North Korean 
nuclear and missile programs until after the domestic issue of abductions was raised.
Alliance to Address North Korean Crisis
Since the Taepodong-1 launch over Japan in 1998, Japan has slowly moved 
towards a hardline diplomatic approach to North Korea, a move that was reinforced by 
the abduction issue.249  It places a great emphasis on removing the threatening missiles 
from North Korea because of this event.  Though Japan has allied itself closely with the 
United States and attempted to present a unified policy, there are subtle differences in the 
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policies of the two countries.  There are clear limits as to how far Japan will go with this 
hardline policy, since it is unlikely to favor war.250
The official stance of the coalition is unyielding and is built on talking, not 
negotiating with North Korea.251  By presenting a unified front, the group has prevented 
North Korea from dividing and conquering, as they have attempted to do in the past.  The 
crux of the policy is to provide North Korea with stark choices between abandoning its 
negative behaviors or war.252  This is far different from the Agreed Framework where 
both sides sought a negotiated agreement.
Like the United States, Japan wants a comprehensive solution to all issues that are 
a part of the current North Korea negotiations.253  However, unlike the United States, 
there appears to be a limit to how far Japan will go to realize those objectives. One reason 
for this is that Japan does not want to take an approach that could provoke North Korea 
into taking aggressive action.254  Secondly, Japan is opposed to the United States’ policy 
of pre-emptive strikes and regime change.255 Japan is situated at a much closer to 
proximity to North Korea and it has been proven that North Korean missiles can hit 
Japan.256  Contrarily, the United States has the benefit of strategic depth and cannot be 
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reliably targeted by North Korean missiles.257  This makes any potential attack by North 
Korea much more threatening to Japan than it is to the United States.
Instead of the hardline approach that the United States has developed, Japan 
would much prefer a system of carrots and sticks to encourage a peaceful solution with 
clear incentives and benchmarks for North Korea.258  Japan is willing to do so because it 
is completely inflexible on the abduction issue, and will therefore take a hardline 
approach on that aspect to the negotiations, but is somewhat more flexible on the issue of 
proliferation and missiles.259  Japan places a great emphasis on the solution of the 
abduction issue which is a domestic issue unique to Japan. The Japanese public has 
reacted to no other issue in the current crisis like it has to the abductions and it has 
become the centerpiece of Japan’s involvement in the diplomatic efforts to engage North 
Korea.260  The United States does not face a similar issue, and has the flexibility to act 
differently due to its different motives and goals.  However, this alliance has ensured that 
the abduction issue is a talking point at the Six Party Talks, where it can be effectively 
addressed.261
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Six Party Talks
The ‘Six Party Talks’ were series of multilateral talks that took place in Beijing, 
China from August 27-29, 2003.  These talks included North Korea, Russia, China, South 
Korea, the United States, and Japan.  The purpose was to address nuclear proliferation 
and other security issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula in a multilateral framework 
involving all the regional powers of Northeast Asia.  Although no major breakthroughs 
occurred on these issues, the talks were significant in that the framework sought by 
Japan, the United States and their allies did not fall apart.262
All of the countries involved in the talks, other than North Korea, had the 
common interest of ending proliferation on the Korean peninsula.  Of secondary concern 
were the issues of long range missiles, economic aid, non-aggression and normalization 
of relations with North Korea.263  Though all parties had the same stated aims, as 
previously discussed subtle differences existed that were pursued bilaterally with North 
Korea in the larger setting of the multilateral talks.  Japan’s policy position raised the 
importance of ending North Korea’s bio-chemical weapons program and of resolving the 
abduction issue.264  Japan was clearly willing to agree to the priorities of its allies, but had 
differences in its stance because it placed special emphasis on issues with domestic 
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importance.  In point of fact, Japan participated in the multilateral framework in order to 
realize its desire for bilateral negotiations on the abduction issue.265
Though Japan played a major role in these talks by taking the lead on confronting 
North Korea over its proliferation and deception, its role in this capacity was 
marginalized by North Korea’s desire to negotiate the nuclear issue with only the United 
States.266  However, this does show that Japan has progressed towards normalizing its 
security and diplomatic relations in that it is willing to take a confrontational role on 
security issues despite potentially violent repercussions.  This serves as a direct contrast 
to the period of the Agreed Framework when Japan did not seek to take part in 
negotiations and only later took a role in providing economic aid and incentives to North 
Korea.  Clearly, there has been a change in Japan’s posture and in the way it perceives its 
security interests.
While confronting North Korea during the multilateral talks, Japan also conducted 
two rounds of bilateral talks with its neighbor.  During the first round of bilateral talks, 
Japan demanded that North Korea explain the deaths of the missing abductees.  North 
Korea responded that Japan violated the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration and that it had no 
obligation to provide an explanation.267  This is a clear manifestation of the behavior that 
Downs discussed.  North Korea made an agreement with Japan and then reinterpreted the 
agreement, blaming Japan for its failure.
After this initial round of bilateral talks, Japan conducted a second round with 
North Korea in which it again demanded the resolution of the abduction issue.  North 
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Korea’s response was the same.268  However, after this round of negotiations, North 
Korea sought to expel Japan from any further rounds of talks.269  Though the other four 
parties in the talks insisted on Japan’s continued participation, this significantly hampers 
the prospects of a future resolution to the issue since Japan appears to be facing a brick 
wall in negotiations with North Korea.  
In its evaluation of the 6 Party Talks, MOFA made several observations.  First, it 
was significant that the six parties got together and negotiated a potential settlement to 
the nuclear issue.  At these talks, Japan was successful in relaying the importance of the 
abduction issue even though it was not resolved.270  Furthermore, MOFA stated that “it is 
necessary to create an opportunity for discussions between Japan and North Korea as 
quickly as possible.”271  Rather than serve as a bystander, Japan is attempting to assert 
itself through this diplomatic process and pursue its unique interests while also 
contributing in some way to regional and international security.  This is a significant step 
though it has ultimately been driven by a unique circumstance in Japanese domestic 
politics.
The next round of talks are crucial to Japan and every other country with an 
interest in resolving the North Korean issue.  The first round of multilateral talks showed 
North Korea the extent of its isolation and layed out the essential arguments that will be 
pursued in future talks.272  Japan must continue to show the same level of participation in 
both multilateral and bilateral formats if it hopes to make any progress on the 
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abductions.273  Though these talks were originally scheduled for December 2003, they 
have been delayed because North Korea has proven obstinate in agreeing to the wording 
for a formal declaration to close the first round of talks, pursuing a marked stalling 
tactic.274  The resumption of these talks is critical to Japan as any delay could allow North 
Korea to make further, un-monitored progress towards combining its nuclear and missile 
technology and threatening Japan’s very existence.
Japan’s participation in these talks offers several points that are indicative of 
larger, overall trends.  First, Japan is more willing than it has been in the past to take a 
controversial and hardline approach with the United States.275  This was not seen during 
the Persian Gulf War, but has now occurred in both the war on terrorism and in the six 
party talks.  Second, even though Japan’s participation is ultimately domestically driven, 
Japan will assert itself to confront transgressions in the international community.  
PSI and other non-diplomatic efforts
One alarming problem that Japan has had to confront is that it has become a 
conduit for North Korean smuggling.  North Korean ships make approximately 1400 port 
calls a year in Japan, and are suspected of smuggling out both dual use nuclear materials 
and hard currency.276  To control this action, Japan signed the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), created by the United States, aimed at curbing the spread of nuclear 
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materials worldwide by encouraging more intense inspections of shipping and stopping 
ships at sea that are suspected of committing these crimes.277  This initiative has been 
enthusiastically embraced by Japan to crackdown on North Korean ships.  Japan’s 
participation in this initiative has not required new laws or new interpretations, but has 
merely required the strict enforcement of pre-existing laws.278
In September 2003, Japan and several other PSI countries took part in joint 
exercises to practice intercepting ships at sea.279  This exercise illustrates one of the 
difficulties that Japan has in participating in international security.  For the exercise, the 
ship that was being chased down had to be under the Japanese flag or the Japanese Coast 
Guard could not use it for training exercises.280  If Japan is serious about conducting such
exercises as part of the international community, it must begin to make its military 
amenable to such participation.  At some point, the legal structure must be amended to 
allow for action or Japan will see its role marginalized if other countries do not want to 
constantly make the concessions necessary for Japan to play a large role.  However, most 
importantly, these exercises provided the Coast Guard with experience at intercepting 
ships suspected of carrying WMD.
The area where the new initiative and practice have manifested themselves most 
directly is in dealings with the North Korean ferry, Mangyongbong-92.  That ferry makes 
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several port calls a week in Japan, and allows citizens in both countries to visit relatives 
in the other.  However, the ferry fell under suspicion in late 2002 when two North Korean 
defectors testified in front of the US Congress.  Both men independently verified that the 
ferry had been responsible for smuggling 80% of the parts used in the North Korean 
nuclear reactors.281  The ferry has also been suspected of smuggling drugs and hard 
currency to North Korea.  After these allegations were made, Japan enforced tougher 
inspections on North Korean shipping.282
North Korea responded by suspending ferry service from January 15, 2003 to 
August 22, 2003.283  The resumption of the ferry service in August was not without 
difficulties.  The ferry was impounded upon its arrival in Japan by 1500 police officers, 
who conducted an eight hour inspection of the ship.284  No illegal materials were found
during this inspection, but the captain of the ship was prosecuted for carrying 255 
passengers as opposed to the ship’s stated 250 passengers.285  Though not a major 
impropriety by North Korea, this event shows Japan’s commitment to the PSI.  It is 
willing to inspect ships and hold them accountable for even the most minor of 
transgressions.  This is significant in that it can greatly aid in preventing the flow of 
nuclear materials in and out of North Korea in the future.  Though Japan is acting out of 
self-interest, it is nonetheless contributing to the security of the international community.
However, Japan’s adherence to the tenets of the PSI is not nearly as 
comprehensive as it would first appear.  The United States, as the driving force behind 
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the PSI, aims to curb weapons smuggling worldwide, and also favors a naval blockade of 
North Korea.286  These are two steps that Japan is not willing to take.  Although Japan 
has significantly increased ship inspections and has considered sanctions, North Korea 
has warned that any attempt to create a naval blockade would be considered an act of war 
and would nullify the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration.287  If Japan is truly committed to 
playing a role commensurate with its position in the international community, it must 
take greater steps towards fighting proliferation and greater participation in the PSI is one 
way in which it must do that.
Stopping the spread of WMD on the high seas is not the only problem that faces 
Japan with regards to North Korea.  A second front in that war is the transfer of money, 
which was first identified as problematic in 1991 by a Japanese think tank.288  Though 
Japan took secret measures through the NPA to curb the flow of illegal funds in 1993, 
little was accomplished.289  Annual transfers continued to rise through the 1990’s and are 
estimated to be approximately Y180 billion to Y200 billion per year today.290  The 
majority of this money comes from the Korean community in Japan as well as from 
Japanese families and businesses that are sympathetic to the North Korean cause.291  The 
inevitable problem that these transfer payments created was how to legally prevent 
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Japanese citizens from sending money to another country without limiting people’s 
freedom.292
The issue of money transfers was confused by the Japanese legal structure.  For 
years, Japan maintained publicly that a UN resolution was needed to publicly end cash 
remittances to North Korea.293  However, Japan has reversed its position and Diet 
members are working on introducing a bill that will ban money transfers to North 
Korea.294  This will reinforce a broader interpretation of the Foreign Exchange and 
Foreign Trade Control Law that has allowed the government to crack down on firms 
trading dual use goods and transferring money to North Korea.295  These measures are 
important as they will be another measure to isolate North Korea and force it to negotiate 
with the international community as a normalized country.  Notably, they have cut 
Japanese trade with North Korea by 40% since they were introduced.296
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Chapter 4
Iraq: A New Policy or a Return?
79
Unlike the first Persian Gulf War of 1991, the current war in Iraq has seen high 
levels of Japanese support and participation. During the lead up to the Iraq war, Japan 
was one of the United States’ most ardent supporters as it sought to gain a UN Security 
Council resolution authorizing the use of force.  Japan has since pledged and provided 
rear-echelon support in the form of 560 SDF troops deployed in Iraq.  This continues the 
trend that began during the war on terror of rear-echelon military support as a baseline of 
participation when there are domestic forces favorable to participation.  Though it may 
seem that Japan does not have domestic interests in Iraq, North Korea has been the 
driving force behind Japanese deployments to the Middle East.
Japan’s biggest contribution to Iraqi reconstruction has been money.  Early on, 
Japan contributed $100 million in refugee aid and has since made even greater 
contributions.297  At the Madrid Donors Conference this fall, Japan revealed a four year 
aid package worth $5 billion.  In the first year, Japan will provide Iraq with a $1.5 billion 
grant, and will then provide $3.5 billion worth of low interest loans for the remaining 
four years.298  In addition, Japan pledged to transfer $98 million in frozen assets from the 
Hussein regime to the new Iraqi government.299  This is indeed a major contribution to 
Iraqi reconstruction as compared to donations made by other countries.  However, it 
represents only half of Japan’s yearly expenditures on UN support.300  Secondly, it is just 
over one third of Japan’s total contributions to the Persian Gulf War.  Though its 
financial contribution is not as great as in 1991, Japan is still inclined to provide 
substantial economic support as part of its initial support.
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The United States has also exerted heavy pressure on Japan to make military 
contributions in Iraq, starting in May 2003 at a summit where President Bush requested 
1000 SDF troops for logistical support.301  Similar statements were made by other 
members of the Bush administration, ranging from Paul Wolfowitz to Richard Armitage, 
who hopes that “the nation will decide to get out of the stands and onto the playing 
field.”302  These statements amount to tacit pressure by the United States for Japan to put 
the SDF into a position where it can take a role in Iraqi reconstruction and help in 
providing a stable security environment there.
One of the obstacles that Japan has faced in providing the United States with the 
support it desires is that it had to pass a Diet bill allowing for the dispatch of the SDF to 
Iraq that both sanctioned the use of force and set limits upon its scope and duration.  The 
passage of this law was opposed by the DPJ, which was against any SDF deployment.303
The DPJ cited three laws in opposition to the Iraq bill, which were the laws governing 
participation in PKO, the Anti-Terror Special Measures Act and laws allowing US 
assistance in emergency circumstances.  All three of these laws require permission from 
the countries the SDF is sent to, and stipulated that areas of deployment must be covered 
by a ceasefire agreement.304  The DPJ argued that the Iraq bill did not set similar limits on 
the SDF.
To counter these arguments, the LDP extended the Diet session by forty days until 
the bill was eventually passed on July 28, 2003.  The bill carried a four year limit and 
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provided for a two stage deployment.305  The first stage was to send C 130’s to 
neighboring countries followed by a GSDF dispatch to ‘safe areas’ in Iraq.306  The 
passage of this law was coupled with a second law that relaxed the laws governing the 
use of force by the SDF in Iraq for two years.307  These are major steps towards Japan 
taking on a normalized role in security affairs since it represents a major policy 
reorientation, as the SDF is increasingly becoming a normalized military force.
However, the SDF dispatch to Iraq has been delayed several times.  Initially, a 
small contingent of SDF advisors was sent to Iraq on a fact-finding mission to asses the 
security conditions and determine how the SDF could contribute to Iraqi 
reconstruction.308  That initial fact-finding mission determined that the security 
environment in Iraq was not sufficiently stable to allow for the dispatch of a major SDF 
contingent and that there was no specific need for the SDF in Iraq.309  Since that first 
visit, the SDF sent ten subsequent fact finding missions, prior to deployment.310  Japan 
was slow in providing SDF support, and appeared to have been looking for specific 
conditions in which the SDF could provide support without changing its basic posture.
During this process, there have been several specific events that have contributed 
to the delays.  First, the bombing of UN headquarters in Iraq caused a serious delay in 
Japan’s deployment.311 Much as this impacted on Japanese thinking, the event that most 
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affected Japanese planning was the murder of two Japanese diplomats in Iraq.312  The two 
diplomats were in Iraq attending an international aid conference when they were 
ambushed and murdered, raising painful memories in Japan of the two GSDF troops that 
died during a peace keeping operation in Cambodia several years ago.313  At that time, 
Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda said that Japan would send the SDF to Iraq if 
circumstances permit, but they did not at that time.314 This raised an essential 
disagreement between the United States and Japan, that being what a ‘state of war’ is and 
whether Iraq is still in one.315  This caused a GSDF dispatch that was originally planned 
for November 2003 to be delayed until December of that year.316  Japan wanted to send 
the SDF, but only when conditions were right for its mission.
Public opinion in Japan has remained marginally against such the SDF 
deployment to Iraq, constraining the ability of the government to change its military 
posture more significantly.317  Beyond this, Japan delayed SDF deployment because it 
simply has a different Middle East strategy than the United States in that it has relations 
with both Iran and Iraq.318  Since the Persian Gulf War, Japan has increased the amount 
of oil that it buys from the Middle East by 18%, with nearly 88% of its total purchases 
coming from that region.319  Most significantly, Japan’s warming of relations with Iran 
has led to several lucrative development contracts and the bulk of that increase in 
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regional oil expenditures.  Iran has been skeptical of Japan’s role in Iraqi reconstruction, 
which is a major barrier given Japan’s oil dependence on that country.320
However, on its final fact-finding mission, the GSDF went to Samawah, where it 
met with the Dutch security force in the region to asses the security situation.321  The 
mission determined that the region of Samawah in southern Iraq was safe enough for 
SDF deployment.322 This JDA has since deployed approximately 560 GSDF troops, to 
focus on supplying medical care, fresh water and other logistical concerns.323   A 
statement accompanied this from JDA Director Ishiba, who said, “a country must 
contribute to the international community in accordance with its national strength.”324
Though hawkish statements were made, if that was the true impetus for providing support 
in Iraq, it would have been provided earlier as the security situation did not change that 
much in the interim.
Though reorienting Japan’s security posture had some influence on the decision to 
deploy the SDF to Iraq, it was not the sole driver.325 In the other case studies discussed, 
there was a domestic factor that influenced Japan to alter its security posture.  According 
to Sean Curtin, the “current strategy is based on a careful set of calculations in a high 
stakes game of international poker.”326  The Japanese leadership understands that any 
resolution of the North Korean situation requires the aid of the Untied States, meaning 
that Japan “has no alternative but to support the United States fully on Iraq if it expects 
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help solving the North Korea issue.”327  Essentially, Japan promised troops towards the 
effort in Iraq to gain the United States’ support in dealing with North Korea.
Similar to the war on terror, Japan has provided rear-echelon military support 
when there is a domestic driver present. The major distinction to be drawn between this 
war and the first Persian Gulf War is that there is a domestic driver inherent in the present 
context.  As previously discussed, North Korea is an issue with significant domestic 
resonance in current Japanese domestic politics.  A similar domestic issue was not 
present in the past, and this accounts for the major change in Japan’s response.  Though it 
has not gone as far as providing front-line support, this is a significant reorientation as 
Japan has deployed the SDF to a country without its permission and Japanese domestic 
threat perceptions have begun to take on some broader characteristics within the 
international system. 
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Conclusion
86
Japan’s security policy has experienced significant changes since the end of the 
Cold War.  In the early and mid-1990’s, Japan pursued a policy of ‘checkbook 
diplomacy,’ as evidenced by both the Persian Gulf War and the Agreed Framework.  In
the first Persian Gulf War, Japan’s oil interests were significantly threatened and it did 
not provide the support that the United States desired, but instead made a major financial 
contribution.  Similarly, during the Agreed Framework period, Japan did not exert its 
diplomatic muscle, but later provided major financial support for KEDO.  Japan avoided 
becoming more heavily involved in security affairs if it could pay other countries to do it 
for them in both these cases.  However, there were no domestic forces that pushed for 
Japanese involvement in international security efforts for either of those cases.  Iraq 
posed no direct military threat to Japan, and there was no domestic pressure to take a 
hardline stance towards North Korea in the mid-1990’s.
Japan’s response to security dilemmas began to change in 2001 when Japan 
pledged rear-echelon military support for the war on terror.  Japan passed new laws 
allowing the SDF to provide support for combat operations, and provided the United 
States with significant diplomatic support.  The major impetus for this change was that 
Japan had been the victim of terrorism in the past in the form of bio-chem attacks on the 
Japanese train and subway system by a religious terrorist group.  Those attacks bore some 
similarity with the September 11 attacks in the United States, and had domestic resonance 
in Japan.  Though many of the moves Japan made were largely symbolic, it represents a 
changing security policy by Japan since it provided SDF support due to the presence of a
domestic driver.
87
Some considered this a watershed event and predicted that Japan would continue 
to provide rear-echelon support as a cornerstone of security policy in all cases.  However, 
the North Korean case has shown that Japan’s security policy is largely driven by 
domestic forces. Even though missiles and nuclear proliferation are more threatening to 
Japan geostrategically, they were ignored through the late 1990’s.  Abductions became 
the major driving force behind Japan’s policy towards North Korea.  The fact that a 
policy reorientation occurred only after North Korea admitted the abductions indicates 
that Japan’s policy is driven by that factor. It has allowed Japan to take on a much larger 
diplomatic role than it did ten years ago and has led to an acknowledgement that Japan is 
threatened by North Korea.
Though sending troops to Iraq can also be pointed to as an example of Japan 
participating internationally without a domestic justification, it is a result of being trapped 
and forced to follow through on promises it made to garner support on the North Korean 
issue.  It is clear from the numerous fact-finding missions that Japan would prefer not to 
take on a front line role, and did not want to fundamentally change its security posture.   
However, due to the strong domestic factors pushing for a strong position vis-à-vis North 
Korea, Japan has expanded its security commitments. Japan established itself as one of 
the most ardent supporters of the United States, and has contributed to the stability of a 
war torn Iraq.  Without the US support that was guaranteed through the commitment to 
Iraq, that likely would not have occurred.
These case studies reveal several key trends that will continue to be present in 
Japan’s security policy in the future.  First, Japan will continue to make significant 
financial contributions to security efforts.  Second, Japan can and will provide rear-
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echelon, logistical support.  However, that will only occur when there is a domestic 
driver for such support.  The final trend is that such support will only be provided for 
action taken by the United States in pursuit of the relief of those domestic pressures in 
Japan.  This raises the question of what kind of ally the US can expect Japan to be, and 
what the effects will be on the bilateral US-Japan Alliance.  
The United States should expect Japan to continue to be a strong ally on a case by 
case basis.  It has shown a propensity to participate in US led efforts to provide for 
collective security with a gradually expanding scope.  This has happened in Afghanistan, 
North Korea, and now in Iraq.   However, Japan will not contribute to all US efforts as 
the domestic drivers that have been present in these three cases will not be present in all.  
For instance, would Japan contribute to collective security efforts in Southeast Asia?  In 
that situation, Japan would likely provide economic support and some rear-echelon 
support if sufficient pressure is exerted.  Japan would not immediately participate since 
there would not be a strong domestic driver.  Japan will continue to provide more real 
military support for the United States, but it will continue to be dictated by these 
domestic factors and will not extend to all circumstances.  It is still representative of 
increased burden sharing by Japan, though.
Increased Japanese burden sharing should take several forms in the future.  Japan 
has huge diplomatic resources that should be used in situations like the Afghan war when 
the United States could not conduct diplomacy directly with Iran.  Secondly, Japan can 
continue to provide rear-echelon support for the US on a broader range of efforts.  The 
SDF has untapped resources that can be utilized throughout Asia.  It has already been 
noted that Japan would not readily deploy to Southeast Asia, but that is exactly where 
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such expertise could have the most impact through humanitarian support.328  Japan must 
continue to expand in these areas and gradually change its strategy to allow for collective 
security that has been prevented in the past.
For the short-term, Japan must continue to develop an effective strategy to 
address the North Korean crisis.  As previously noted, Japan does not have a nuclear 
deterrent against North Korea, and must rely on US guarantees.  Though Japan has 
significant, latent nuclear capability, a move to create a nuclear arsenal could create a 
regional arms race that could spillover into other unstable areas such as the Taiwan 
Straits region.  This leaves both the United States and Japan in a vicarious position as 
neither state wants to reward North Korea for nuclear proliferation, and presents a major 
policy conundrum since they cannot risk war with North Korea and cannot reinforce its 
behavior.
Japan should pursue close policy coordination with the United States, as it has 
already done.  That policy should provide clear benchmarks for North Korea that 
encourage it to resolve the abduction issue and to give up its weapons, but also provide it 
with clearly articulated consequences should it continue to proliferate.  Japan should 
focus most specifically on resolving the abduction issue by offering economic incentives 
to North Korea and should leave the military alternatives to the United States.  Should 
North Korea not comply, regional powers should cut off economic and energy aid, and 
entertain the possibility of military strikes by the United States.  Without foreign aid, 
North Korea simply cannot support its economy and will be forced to give in on some 
issues.  
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This provides a stark choice for North Korea, but fails to eliminate some 
dangerous contingencies.  For instance, North Korea could lash out in a desperate attempt 
to obtain some economic aid.  In that situation, no nuclear deterrent would really deter an 
attack.  To plan for that contingency, Japan must continue to maintain a strong 
relationship with the United States with increased burden sharing as a central component 
to that process.  It must also take measures to protect itself, such as continued joint 
development of missile defense technology with the United States.  Though the 
effectiveness of the missile defense system is questionable at best, it is the only hope to 
prevent a North Korean missile from hitting a major Japanese population center.
From the United State’s perspective, this would be an extremely positive 
relationship.  It would reinforce the policy already being pursued, but could create ways 
to resolve the situation, which the current process does not do.  Support and cooperation 
with regional countries is the only way to effectively address the situation as it prevents 
North Korea from playing countries off one another and gaining concessions that 
reinforce proliferation.  Japan is essential to any such arrangement as it is still the major 
economic power of the region and can provide many of the economic incentives 
discussed.
In sum, Japan’s recent reorientation towards a more normalized security policy 
will be limited as Japan’s participation in security efforts is driven by domestic factors.  
A unique confluence of factors have led Japan to significantly change its policy in recent 
years, but there are still limits.  The best thing that Japan can do to begin to take on a 
more normalized posture is to gradually increase burden sharing, and to maintain a close 
relationship with the United States.  Especially with respect to North Korea, Japan’s best 
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hope for a peaceful resolution is to follow the policy that has been outlined.  If Japan 
follows these proscriptions, its security policy will become normalized in a way that 
minimizes the suspicions of neighboring states and positively contributes to international 
security.
